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ABSTRACT 
Fatigue is one of the main causes of structural failure. In fact, many structural systems such as 
bridges, offshore platforms, and aircraft are subjected to the risk of fatigue-induced failure 
caused by repeated loading over their life cycle. Therefore, structural systems should be designed 
and maintained such that they have an adequate level of structural redundancy to prevent local 
fatigue-induced failures from progressing toward system-level failure such as collapse, which 
may result in complete loss of the structural system and catastrophic consequences. For decision-
making with respect to the design, maintenance and retrofit of robust structural systems, it is thus 
essential to estimate their reliability and identify critical sequences of local failures leading to 
system failures. In addition, it is desirable to update the original reliability based on inspection 
results, which will facilitate reliability-based structural maintenance based on the actual 
conditions of structures. 
Performing reliability analysis and updating of fatigue-induced sequential failure of a 
structural system is a challenging task. First, the reliability analysis should be performed at the 
system level in conjunction with sophisticated finite element analysis to account for the complex 
behavior of the structure during fatigue-induced sequential failures including the impact of load 
re-distribution caused by failures at other locations. Second, one might need to explore a huge 
number of failure sequences to estimate the failure risk accurately, especially for complex 
structural systems with high level of redundancy. Third, for accurate system reliability updating, 
precise system reliability estimation should be performed first and then the results should be 
incorporated into a method that can update the original reliability based on inspection results. 
This thesis proposes novel finite-element-based methods for system reliability analysis 
and updating for structures that are subject to the risk of fatigue-induced sequential failures. First 
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of all, a new computational framework is developed which performs finite element reliability 
analysis (FE-RA) at the system level. While many of the existing FE-RA software packages aim 
at reliability analysis at the component level or have the limited capability of their FE modules, 
the new framework enables us to perform system reliability analysis in conjunction with 
sophisticated finite element analysis. Secondly, a new Branch-and Bound method employing 
system reliability Bounds (termed the B3 method) is developed to perform system reliability 
analysis for the fatigue-induced sequential failures of structures. Describing sequential failures as 
disjoint events, the B3 method enables us to estimate the system-level failure probability and 
identify critical failure sequences, more accurately and efficiently than other existing methods. 
The B3 method was originally developed for reliability analysis of discrete structures such as a 
truss, but the method is further developed for its applications to continuum structures. Lastly, a 
new reliability updating method employing the B3 method is proposed to update the system 
reliability analysis results based on structural inspections. The approach can update the original 
failure probability of structures based on various conditions observed during inspections for both 
truss and continuum structures. All of the proposed methods are applied to numerical examples 
of structural systems, and the results are compared with those by Monte Carlo simulations, which 
show that the proposed methods can perform system reliability analysis and updating in 
conjunction with finite element analysis, accurately and efficiently.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent decades, structural reliability theory has flourished to help engineers across various 
disciplines model uncertainties and quantify their impacts on analysis, design, and maintenance. 
Many methods and tools have been developed and applied to structural systems in civil, 
mechanical, nuclear, marine, and aerospace engineering (Thoft-Christensen 1998, Haldar 2006, 
Frangopol and Maute 2003, Moan 2005). A structural system often requires sophisticated 
methods of structural reliability analysis due to its complex failure mechanism. One of the 
examples showing such a challenge is the reliability analysis of structural systems subjected to 
sequential failures induced by fatigue. 
Fatigue is one of the main causes of the failure of structures. Many structural systems 
such as bridges, offshore platforms, and aircraft are subjected to the risk of failures caused by 
repeated loading over their life cycle (Byers et al. 1997, Karamchandani et al. 1992). However, it 
is difficult to predict fatigue-induced failures because fatigue is a complex process including 
various uncertainties, as proved by many laboratory experiment data (Haldar 2006). For this 
reason, many structural reliability methods were developed to analyze the uncertainties in terms 
of failure probability. 
Most of the existing studies about fatigue reliability focus on predicting the fatigue life of 
individual structural members. However, it is noted that a structure should be designed and 
maintained in terms of the system-level performance to achieve an adequate level of structural 
redundancy that would prevent local fatigue-induced failures from progressing toward 
exceedingly large damage such as structural system collapse. Although the system-level 
redundancy plays such an important role in preventing the failure of local members from 
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initiating the collapse of the structural system, there have been few research efforts for fatigue 
life prediction considering the system-level redundancy.  
For risk-informed structural design against fatigue-induced sequential failures, it is 
essential to estimate the reliability of a structural system and to identify critical sequences of 
local failures leading to a system failure. In addition, an adequate level of structural reliability 
needs to be guaranteed through structural maintenance such as inspection, as well as proper 
structural design, and it is thus required to update the original reliability based on inspection 
results. 
For accurate reliability analysis and updating of fatigue-induced sequential failures, it is 
necessary to develop an integrated reliability analysis framework that can address the followings: 
First, structural reliability analysis should be performed in conjunction with finite element (FE) 
analysis, so that structural responses which appear in the limit-state function describing the 
structural failure mode of interest can be evaluated accurately during reliability analysis. Even 
though there are a few computational platforms that link structural reliability analysis with FE 
analysis, most of them still have some limitations in that they perform reliability analysis at the 
component level without considering system-level failures or have FE modules with limited 
capabilities in their applications. 
Second, the sequential failure of a structure needs to be described as a complex “system” 
event which is a logical function consisting of multiple “component” events representing the 
failures of physical structural members or the occurrence of various failure modes. There have 
been many research efforts to develop an accurate and efficient method for the risk analysis of 
the many failure modes. In most cases, however, the existing methods aim to quantify the risks 
of individual local failures only. Such component reliability analysis may cause errors in 
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estimating the actual risk, and system reliability should be introduced to calculate the risk of 
sequential failure of structures accurately. 
Third, for a complex structural system, there exist a huge number of failure sequences to 
explore, which may require overwhelming computational and time costs. Thus, for an efficient 
risk analysis of sequential failure, it is indispensable to have a smart algorithm that minimizes the 
number of failure sequences to explore. Although many research efforts have been made to 
develop efficient searching schemes, these methods are still either time-consuming or prone to 
miss critical failure sequences. In addition, the methods may underestimate the risk due to 
heuristic rules or assumptions that are often introduced to enhance the efficiency of the search. 
Fourth, while fatigue-induced sequential failure is a critical failure mode of various 
structures, most of the existing studies of the system-level reliability analysis of fatigue-induced 
sequential failure have been undertaken for offshore structures, which are often modeled as 
discrete structures (e.g., truss). However, it is noted that reliability analysis for fatigue-induced 
sequential failure is important not only for discrete structures, but also for continuum structures 
such as subsystems in aircraft structures. Therefore, it is required to develop a novel method to 
perform system reliability analysis of fatigue-induced sequential failures for continuum 
structures. 
Lastly, it is beneficial to develop a new method to update the original reliability, which 
was calculated during structural design, based on the observations from structural inspections. 
Practically, the safety of a structural system can be guaranteed through not only proper structural 
design, but also structural maintenance such as inspection. However, many of the existing 
methods developed for reliability updating focus on structural components, and there are few 
studies about reliability updating for sequential failure of a structural system. For an effective 
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inspection planning, it is thus essential to develop a new method for estimating the reliability of 
structures against fatigue-induced sequential failures and updating the original reliability based 
on inspections accurately. 
These challenges motivated the research reported in this thesis, which focuses on 
developing novel frameworks and methods for system reliability analysis and reliability updating 
of fatigue-induced sequential failures based on finite element simulations. In order to overcome 
the aforementioned challenges, an FE-SRA (finite element system reliability analysis), an 
efficient path-searching algorithm, and a reliability updating technique are developed. First, an 
FE-SRA framework was developed by use of a newly-developed interface code that integrates a 
reliability analysis package and FE analysis software. This has been demonstrated through 
examples of structural systems. Second, a new branch-and-bound method that employs system 
reliability bounds (termed the B3 method) has been developed. The B3 method was first 
developed for system reliability analysis for discrete structures, and then further developed for 
continuum structures. The method enables us to estimate system-level failure probability and to 
identify critical fatigue-induced failure sequences accurately and efficiently, and is applicable to 
many types of structures from truss to continuum. Lastly, a reliability updating method 
employing the B3 method was developed to update the original reliability information of a 
structure based on inspection results. 
This Ph.D. thesis summarizes these developments and discusses the future research plan. 
Chapter 2 describes the newly-developed FE-SRA framework and the interface code named as 
FERUM-ABAQUS. Chapter 3 presents the B3 method which is developed for the system 
reliability analysis of fatigue-induced sequential failures in discrete structures. Chapter 4 
discusses the further development of the B3 method for its applications to continuum structures. 
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Chapter 5 introduces the new reliability updating method employing the B3 method. Lastly, 
Chapter 6 summarizes the major finding of this study and provides future research topics. 
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2. FINITE ELEMENT SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS (FE-SRA) 
 
For accurate reliability analysis of fatigue-induced sequential failures, it is necessary to perform 
the reliability analysis at the system level in conjunction with sophisticated finite element (FE) 
analysis. This chapter introduces a new FE-SRA (finite element system reliability analysis) 
framework, which will be introduced in the next chapters as a crucial element of system 
reliability analysis and updating for fatigue-induced sequential failures. 
2.1. Literature Review 
In recent years, many research efforts have been made to perform structural reliability analyses 
with more realistic and complex structural models. The examples include suspension bridge 
(Imai and Frangopol 2002), wing torque box of aircraft (Lee et al. 2008), pylon of cable-stayed 
bridge (Song et al. 2008, Kang et al. 2012), and bridge structure system (Song and Kang 2009). 
In addition, sophisticated reliability methods have been developed to deal with complex failure 
mechanisms such as failure of rigid-plastic structure (Song and Der Kiureghian 2003), 
progressive yielding failure of indeterminate truss structure (Song and Kang 2009), and fatigue-
induced sequential failures of truss structure (Karsan and Kumar 1988, Karamchandani et al. 
1992, Wang et al. 2006). 
In such reliability analyses, it is essential to account for the uncertainties in loading, 
material properties, geometry, etc. Structural reliability analysis requires describing the limit-
state of interests mathematically, in terms of structural response quantities such as strain, 
displacement, stress, force, and energy (Sudret and Der Kiureghian 2000). If the limit-state can 
be represented by a simple algebraic function of random variables representing the 
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aforementioned uncertainties, one can easily perform reliability analysis. In dealing with many 
complex structural systems or failure mechanisms, however, sophisticated structural analyses 
employing a finite element model are needed to evaluate the structural response that appears in 
the limit-state function during the reliability analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to perform 
structural reliability analysis (RA) in conjunction with finite element (FE) analysis, which is 
often termed as finite element reliability analysis (FE-RA) in the literature (Sudret and Der 
Kiureghian 2000, Haukaas 2003, Lee et al. 2008). 
There have been active research efforts to connect the computational modules of FE 
analysis with those for reliability analysis, which resulted in computer software packages such as 
reliability package in OpenSees (Haukaas 2003), FERUM (Haukaas et al. 2003), and RELSYS 
(Estes and Frangopol 1998). Despite these recent advances, there are still two research needs in 
FE-RA. 
First, many of the existing FE-RA software packages mainly perform “component” 
reliability analysis. In other words, the FE reliability analysis is performed for individual failure 
modes of a structural member or location that are represented by single limit-state functions. 
This may lead to an inaccurate estimate on the failure probability of a structural system because 
the overall system-level risk of a structure often needs to be described by means of a “system” 
event, i.e. a logical function of “component” events representing physical components or various 
failure modes (Song and Der Kiureghian 2003, Song and Kang 2009, Lee et al. 2008). The 
failure of a structure may be described as a series, parallel, or general system event (Song and 
Der Kiureghian 2003, Song and Kang 2009, Lee et al. 2008), and this type of reliability analysis 
is often termed as system reliability analysis (SRA).  
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Another limitation of the existing FE-RA software packages is the limited capability of 
their FE modules. For accurate risk estimation, it is desirable that reliability software employs a 
finite element model that can represent the structural behavior most accurately. However, most 
of the existing FE-RA packages contain an FE analysis program whose capability and 
applicability are somewhat limited. In order to have more versatile FE-RA computing platform, 
therefore, it is desirable to develop an interface code between a reliability analysis code and 
general-purpose FE software such as ABAQUS® rather than employing an FE code included in 
the reliability software package. 
To overcome these challenges, advanced FE-RA software packages have been developed 
in recent years, such as NESSUS (SwRI 2009) and STRUREL (Gollwitzer et al. 2006) by 
combining a module of system reliability analysis with FE analysis software. In this Ph.D. 
research, an FE-SRA (FE system reliability analysis) framework that employs a new system 
reliability analysis method is developed (Lee et al. 2008), and an interface code between 
FERUM and ABAQUS® (termed the FERUM-ABAQUS) is developed as a computational 
platform of the research. FERUM (Finite Element Reliability Using Matlab) is a reliability 
analysis package developed by researchers at the UC Berkeley, which allows us to perform 
various reliability analyses (Haukaas et al. 2003). ABAQUS is widely used commercial software 
for FE analysis. By using these two software packages specialized in their own areas, it becomes 
possible to take full advantages of them and solve challenging problems. This chapter describes 
the proposed FE-SRA framework and demonstrates the interface code, FERUM-ABAQUS, with 
numerical examples of an aircraft wing torque box and a bridge pylon. 
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2.2. FE-SRA Using FERUM-ABAQUS 
2.2.1. FE component reliability analysis 
The first step of FE-SRA is to perform FE reliability analyses to compute the probabilities of all 
component failure events that are considered significant. Such an FE component reliability 
analysis is described as 
 
( ) 0
( ) 0 ( ) ,   1,...,
i
i i
g
P P g f d i n

    X
x
X x x   (2.1)
in which Pi and gi(X) respectively denote the probability and the limit-state function of the i-th 
component event, X is the vector of the random variables representing the uncertainties in the 
given problem, fx(x) is the joint probability density function (PDF) of X, and n is the total 
number of component events in the given system event. As previously stated, one approach to 
compute this probability by FE reliability analysis is to link a reliability analysis algorithm with 
an FE code so that the algorithm can import the values and/or sensitivities of gi(X) with respect 
to X, from the computational simulation. Figure 2.1 illustrates this approach and the data flows. 
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Figure 2.1 Data flows during FE reliability analysis 
 
For the numerical examples in this chapter, the first order reliability method (FORM) (see 
Der Kiureghian 2005 for a review) in an open-source reliability code FERUM is used to 
calculate the probability of “component” event in Eq. (2.1). The nonlinear constrained 
optimization problem during FORM analysis needs the values and gradients of the limit-state 
function at each step of the iteration. FERUM-ABAQUS is employed so that FERUM can obtain 
the output responses that appear in the limit-state functions (e.g., strain, displacement, stress, 
force, and energy results) and their gradients from an FE-based computational simulation. 
The component FE reliability analyses provide the probabilities of all the component 
failure events considered. For an accurate SRA, we also need to quantify the statistical 
dependence between the component failure events. For example, if component reliability 
analysis is performed by FORM, it is required for SRA to obtain the normalized negative 
gradient vectors (Der Kiureghian 2005) of the limit-state function, that is 
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)(/)( ** iiiii GG uu    (2.2)
where ( )iG   and ui* respectively denote the gradient vector of the i-th limit-state function Gi(u) 
and the most probable point (or “design point”) in the space of uncorrelated standard normal 
random variables u. In this thesis, the gradient vectors and the normalized gradient vectors are 
given as row vectors. In system reliability analysis, these normalized gradient vectors are used to 
quantify the statistical dependence between the component events, and the procedure will be 
explained in the following section. 
An important by-product of FORM analysis is a set of importance measures that provide 
information as to the order of importance of the random variables. First, when the random 
variables X of a reliability problem are statistically independent, the order of importance of 
random variables can be determined in terms of the normalized negative gradient vectors in Eq. 
(2.2). However, when the random variables are statistically dependent, the following importance 
measure (Der Kiureghian 2005) should be introduced to define the relative importance of the 
random variables X: 
i
i
i
 u,x
u,x
α J Dγ α J D   (2.3)
where Ju,x denotes the Jacobian matrix of the transformation from X to u, and D denotes the 
diagonal matrix of standard deviations of X. The importance measure in Eq. (2.3) is a unit row 
vector defining the relative importance of the original random variables, and a positive (or 
negative) value of this vector indicates that the relevant random variable is of load (or capacity) 
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type. The element-squares of γi are widely used to quantify the relative contributions of the 
random variables to the variance of the limit-state function. 
Lastly, FORM analysis provides us with the sensitivities of the failure probability Pi with 
respect to statistical parameters (e.g., mean and standard deviation) of random variables 
(Bjerager and Krenk 1989). However, these sensitivities may have a scaling problem as 
sensitivity measures. For this reason, they are generally normalized by multiplying standard 
deviation of random variables to these sensitivities. For example, for the j-th random variable (i.e. 
Xj, j=1,…,Nrv) where Nrv is the total number of random variables, 
,
i
i j j
j
P    (2.4a)
,
i
i j j
j
P  
 
(2.4b)
in which μj and σj respectively denote the mean and standard deviation of the j-th random 
variable. The details of the importance measures and sensitivities from FORM can be found in 
Der Kiureghian (2005). 
2.2.2. FE system reliability analysis 
The main goal of SRA is to evaluate the probability of a system event that describes the failure 
of a structural system, that is 



 


k Ci
isys
k
gPP 0)(X  (2.5)
where Ck denotes the index set of components in the k-th cut-set. This general “cut-set” 
formulation can also represent “series” systems (all the cut-sets have only one component) and 
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“parallel” systems (there is only one cut-set). In particular, when FORM is used for the 
component reliability analyses in Eq. (2.5), Psys can be approximately computed as 
 ( ) 0 ( ; )
k
sys i i N
k i C
P P P Z d

           z R z   (2.6)
where Ω denotes the failure domain approximated as a polyhedron determined by linear half 
spaces, βi = αiui* is the reliability index of the i-th component event, Z = {Zi}, i = 1,…,n is the 
vector of standard normal random variables approximately describing the component events by 
βi – Zi ≤ 0, ( ; )N z R  is the joint PDF of Z, and R  is the correlation coefficient matrix of Z in 
which the correlation coefficient between Zi and Zj is computed as Tij i j  α α  (Hohenbichler and 
Rackwitz 1983). 
In order to compute the probability of this logical function of component events from the 
results of individual component reliability analyses, various SRA algorithms have been 
developed, such as theoretical bounding formulas (Ditlevsen 1979), sequentially conditioned 
importance sampling (SCIS) (Ambartzumian et al. 1998), the product of conditional marginals 
(PCM) method (Pandey 1998), the multivariate normal integral method by Genz (1992) 
(applicable to series and parallel systems), and the first-order system reliability methods 
(Hohenbichler and Rackwitz 1983) (applicable to series and parallel systems directly, and to cut-
set and link-set systems indirectly in conjunction with bounding formulas). However, these 
existing methods for system reliability analysis are applicable to “series” and “parallel” systems, 
but not to “general” system events. In addition, they are not flexible in incorporating various 
types and amount of available information on components and their statistical dependence. 
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For these reasons, SRA methods such as the linear programming (LP) bounds method 
(Song and Der Kiureghian 2003, Der Kiureghian and Song 2008), the matrix-based system 
reliability (MSR) method (Kang et al. 2008, Song and Kang 2009, Nguyen et al. 2010b, 2011, 
Song and Ok 2010, Lee et al. 2011, Kang et al. 2012), and the sequential compounding method 
(SCM) (Kang and Song 2010) have been recently developed. These methods are capable of 
solving general system events with various merits. A more comprehensive review on SRA 
methods can be found in Kang (2011). In the examples of this chapter, FE-SRA employs the 
MSR method which is summarized as follows. 
First, consider a system event whose i-th component, i = 1,…,n has two distinct states, 
e.g. the failure and survival. The sample space can be subdivided into m (=2n) mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive (MECE) events. These are named the “basic” MECE events and 
denoted by ej, j = 1,…,m. Then, any system event can be represented by an ‘‘event” vector c 
whose j-th element is 1 if ej belongs to the system event and 0 otherwise. Let pj = P(ej), j = 
1,. . . ,m, denote the probability of ej. Due to the mutual exclusiveness of ej’s, the probability of 
the system event Esys, i.e. P(Esys) is the sum of the probabilities of ej’s that belong to the system 
event. Therefore, the system probability is computed by the inner product of the two vectors, that 
is, 
  T
: j sys
sys sys j
j e E
P E P p

   c p   (2.7)
where p is the ‘‘probability” vector that contains pj’s and c is the “event” vector each of whose 
elements has 1 or 0 depending on whether ej belongs to Esys or not. The formulation in Eq. (2.7) 
can be generalized to compute the probabilities of multiple system events under multiple 
conditions of component failures by a single matrix multiplication (Lee et al. 2011).  
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Furthermore, the MSR method provides us with the normalized parameter sensitivities of 
the system failure probability, i.e. the sensitivities of system failure probability with respect to 
one-standard-deviation-changes of statistical parameters of random variables, based on the 
component-level parameter sensitivities as shown in Eqs. (2.4a) and (2.4b). 
,
sys
sys j j
j
P    (2.8a)
,
sys
sys j j
j
P  
 
(2.8b)
More details about the MSR method can be found in Song and Kang (2009), and the method is 
selected as an SRA method in this chapter because of the following merits over other existing 
methods: First, the probability of a system event is calculated by a simple matrix multiplication 
regardless of the complexity of the system definition. Second, the matrix-based formulation 
helps identify/handle the system events conveniently and compute the corresponding 
probabilities efficiently. Third, even when one has incomplete information on the component 
failure probabilities and/or their statistical dependence, the matrix-based framework still enables 
obtaining the narrowest possible bounds on any general system event using the LP bounds 
method. Fourth, once the probability of the system event is obtained, one can easily calculate the 
probabilities of other system events, conditional probabilities and component importance 
measures without additional probability calculations. Fifth, the recent developments of matrix-
based computer languages and software have rendered matrix calculations more efficient and 
easier to implement. Finally, the MSR method can account for the statistical dependence 
between components and compute the sensitivity of the system reliability with respect to design 
parameters for general system events.  
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2.3. Numerical Example I: Wing Torque Box 
2.3.1. Problem description 
The proposed framework for FE-SRA and the interface code, FERUM-ABAQUS, are 
demonstrated by a numerical example of a 4-bay wing torque box (Lee et al. 2008) shown in 
Figure 2.2.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Wing torque box example 
 
This is a hypothetical example created to test the existing and new methods for 
quantifying the risk and uncertainty in a sub-structure of generic aircraft structures. The initial 
drawing was created by Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) for the purpose of this research. 
Its dimensions are 1.52 meters (60 inches) length, 0.64 meters (25.2 inches) width, and 7.6 to 
10.2 centimeters (3.0 to 4.0 inches) height. It is assumed that the main material of the wing box 
is Aluminum 7075-T6, which shows linear elasticity until it reaches yielding stress. The 
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structural system consists of numerous physical parts such as skins, spars, ribs, and connectors as 
shown in Figure 2.2. During FE reliability analyses, statistically independent random variables 
are assigned to describe the uncertainties in the material yield strengths and Young’s modulus of 
all the parts individually.  
In this example, three reference load combinations (A, B and C) are considered to 
represent random loading conditions. Each operational loading for the 4-bay wing box model is 
described by the combination of moments and torques applied to each end of the box, and a 
pressure distribution on the lower surface.  These load combinations are results of the 4-bay 
model being a portion of a complete wing. One of the three load cases is shown in Figure 2.3 
with the corresponding spatial distribution of Von-Mises stress computed by an FE analysis. It 
was noted that the maximum stress under the given load case “A” occurs at the front side of the 
inboard edge. The other two loading cases resulted in maximum stresses at similar locations. The 
actual loads can vary with the structural characteristics and flight patterns of aircraft, and 
environmental effects such as humidity and barometric pressure. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Reference load case “A” and corresponding stress distribution by FE analysis 
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This example accounts for three kinds of uncertainties by use of random variables: (1) 
Young’s modulus; (2) yield strength; and (3) load scale factor in the load spectrum. The first two 
characterize the uncertainty in the material properties and capacities while the third represents 
the uncertainties in loads and demands. Table 2.1 summarizes the mean, coefficient of variation 
(c.o.v.) and the type of distribution used for each type of uncertainty in this example.  
 
 Mean c.o.v. Distribution Type 
Young’s modulus 71,700 (MPa) 0.100 Normal 
Yield strength 524 (MPa) 0.050 Lognormal 
Load scale factor 0.300 0.400 Lognormal 
 
Table 2.1 Statistical properties of random variables 
 
The wing torque box is composed of two skins, three ribs, four spars (one front spar, one 
rear spar, and two middle spars), and many connectors. Since they are usually manufactured 
using separate raw materials, statistically independent random variables are assigned to Young’s 
moduli of the nine parts. From preliminary FE reliability analyses, it was observed that the 
contribution of Young’s moduli of the connectors to the variance of the limit-state function is 
insignificant. Therefore, a single random variable represents Young’s moduli of all the 
connectors. This assumption helps reduce the number of random variables during FE reliability 
analyses. As a result, in this example ten random variables represent the uncertainty in Young’s 
moduli (two for skins, three for ribs, four for spars, and one for connectors). 
The statistical properties of the material yield strength were extracted from Military 
Handbook 5 (U.S. Department of Defense 2005), now known as Metallic Material Properties 
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Databook (MMPD), which provides two classes of guidelines on yield strength of the target 
material: A-basis and B-basis. These are nominal values of the strengths defined as of the 
thresholds of 99% and 90% exceedence probabilities, respectively. Assuming that the strengths 
follow a normal distribution, the mean and standard deviation of the experimental data of yield 
strength were back-calculated. 
The uncertain time variation of the intensity of the loading during a flight is characterized 
by use of FALSTAFF spectrum (Van Dijk and De Jonge 1975). It is assumed that all the loads in 
each load case, e.g., bending moment, torsion and pressure are in-phase and thus uniformly 
scaled by the spectrum. The FALSTAFF spectrum is normalized to the considered load cases so 
that 1.0 in the spectrum corresponds to the magnitudes in the given load case. Figure 2.4 shows 
the exceedence plot of peak values in the FALSTAFF spectrum. Based on this plot, the 
distribution of load scale factor is fitted to a log-normal distribution whose mean and c.o.v. are 
0.30 and 0.40, respectively (See Figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.4 Exceedence Plot for FALSTAFF spectrum (Peak) 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Fitting plot to FALSTAFF spectrum 
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All the random variables are assumed to be uncorrelated except the three random 
variables used for the load scale factors. The statistical dependence between three loading cases 
is not known, so a parametric study is performed by varying correlation coefficient between the 
load cases. 
This example focuses on the failure due to yielding. Therefore, the failure of the i-th 
component is described by use of a limit-state function 
0)()()(  XXX iiyig    (2.9)
where )(Xiy  is the yield strength of the physical part (e.g., spars, skins), and ( )i X  is the 
maximum Von-Mises stress estimated by FE analysis. 
2.3.2. Analysis results 
Before performing reliability analyses, the maximum Von-Mises stress response of each part is 
computed by deterministic FE analyses by use of the mean values of the random variables in 
Table 2.1. The results are shown in Table 2.2. 
 
Maximum stress (MPa) Load A Load B Load C 
Upper skin 128.9 120.2 168 
Lower skin 132 (E6) 129.3 188.3 
Front spar 143.8 (E4) 162.2 (E3) 301.4 (E1) 
Middle spar (Inboard) 71.6 73.2 151.3 
Middle spar (Tip) 38.1 63.1 137.9 
Rear spar 77.9 92 210.6 
Rib (Inboard) 85.8 132.2 (E5) 269.8 (E2) 
Rib (Middle) 21.7 35.6 72.6 
Rib (Tip) 16.8 34.8 69.5 
 
Table 2.2 Maximum stress response for each part under three loading cases 
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The results of this preliminary deterministic analysis help identify important component 
events to be considered during system reliability analysis. Two yielding failure events with top 
maximum stress results for each load cases are selected as shown in Table 2.2 (in bold). These 
component events are denoted by E1 to E6. FE reliability analyses of these component events are 
performed individually by FORM using FERUM-ABAQUS. Table 2.3 shows the component 
failure probabilities. 
 
Component event  Failure probability (× 10–2) 
E1 (Load C; Front spar) 5.51989 
E2 (Load C; Rib inboard) 2.85896 
E3 (Load B; Front spar) 0.07515 
E4 (Load A; Front spar) 0.02923 
E5 (Load B; Rib inboard) 0.01010 
E6 (Load A; Lower skin) 0.01087 
 
Table 2.3 Probabilities of component failure events by FORM analysis 
 
The importance measure in Eq. (2.3) quantifies the relative contribution of the random 
variables to the total variance of the limit-state function. In this example, the load sale factors are 
identified as the most important ones with around 98% contribution for each component failure 
event. This relative importance may change if other failure modes such as fatigue are considered 
for reliability analyses. 
FORM analysis provides the sensitivity of the failure probability with respect to the 
statistical parameters as well. Using these component-level sensitivities, it is possible to compute 
the sensitivity-based importance measures in Eqs. (2.4a) and (2.4b). For example, the results for 
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the component event E1 are shown in Table 2.4, which confirms the dominance of the uncertainty 
in the loading to the component failure probability. 
 
Random variables 11, j j
j
P  
1
1, j j
j
P    
Young’s 
modulus 
Connector −0.0011 0 
Rib (Inboard) −0.0973 0.0014 
Rib (Middle) −0.0019 0 
Rib (Tip) 0.001 0 
Lower skin −1.203 0.2071 
Upper skin 0.0442 0.0003 
Front spar 1.3034 0.2431 
Middle spar 
(Inboard) −0.0666 0.0006 
Middle spar (Tip) −0.002 0 
Rear spar −0.021 0.0001 
Load scale 
factor 
Combination A 0 0 
Combination B 0 0 
Combination C 3.402 5.317 
Yield strength (Front spar) −1.4354 0.3575 
 
Table 2.4 Sensitivity-based importance measures for E1 (× 10–2) 
 
In order to compute the system probability in Eq. (2.4), the correlation coefficient matrix 
R is constructed by the inner product of the negative normalized gradient vectors, i.e. Tρ ij i j α α . 
Table 2.5 shows the correlation coefficient matrix when the correlation coefficient between the 
scale factors of different load cases is assumed to be 0.4.  
 
  
24 
 
Correlation E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 
E1 1 0.961 0.426 0.425 0.395 0.379 
E2  1 0.397 0.398 0.413 0.414 
E3   1 0.425 0.959 0.380 
E4    1 0.396 0.942 
E5  Symmetric  1 0.415 
E6      1 
 
Table 2.5 Correlation matrix with six component failure events 
 
One noticeable fact from this table is that there are strong correlations between the 
following event pairs: (E1 and E2), (E3 and E5), and (E4 and E6). These pairs respectively 
represent failure events under load cases A, B, and C, which also proves that loading scale 
factors are most contributory to the failure events. 
These results of component reliability analysis are used for system reliability analysis. 
Let us first consider the series system event of the identified components: 
6
1

i
isys EE   (2.10)
This means that the structural system “fails” if any of these six component events occurs. For the 
component failure events whose probabilities and correlations are shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.5, 
the probability of the system event in Eq. (2.10) is computed by the MSR method. Table 2.6 
compares the results by the MSR method with those by theoretical bounding formulas, i.e. Uni-
component bounds (Boole 1854) and Bi-component bounds formulas (Ditlevesen 1979). The 
results by the MSR method are included in the relatively wider bounds by theoretical bounding 
formulas. It is also noteworthy that the system failure probability is higher than the probability of 
the most likely component failure event E1. This means that component FE reliability analysis 
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may underestimate the risk of the overall system particularly when there is no dominant 
component event. 
 
Method System failure probability (× 10–2) 
MSR 5.7431 
Uni-component 
bounds 5.5199 ~ 8.5042 
Bi-component 
bounds 5.7104 ~ 5.7451 
 
Table 2.6 Failure probability of series system 
 
In order to investigate the effect of statistical dependence between different load cases on 
the system failure probability, FE system reliability analyses are performed with varying 
correlation coefficients between the three load scale factors. As previously stated, the correlation 
matrix in Table 2.5 is calculated with the assumption that the correlation coefficient between the 
scale factors of different load cases is 0.4. However, the correlation between the component 
events is affected by the correlation coefficient between load scale factors, which therefore 
affects the system probability as well. For a series system event, for example, it is known that 
high correlation between component events reduces the failure probability. Figure 2.6 shows the 
effect of the statistical dependence between the load scale factors on the system reliability 
estimates. Figure 2.6a shows the probabilities from the MSR method, Uni-component bounds, 
and Bi-component bounds. Figure 2.6b compares the results from the MSR method and Bi-
bounds only to show the effect of the statistical dependence more clearly. 
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Figure 2.6 Parametric study on the effect of correlation between load scale factors 
 
An important merit of the MSR method is that the method can estimate the probabilities 
of other system events of interest without significantly increasing computational cost. For 
example, suppose we are interested in the probability of a system event that the yielding failure 
occurs “only” by load case B, i.e. 
642153 )( EEEEEEEsys    (2.11)
Using the matrix procedure of the MSR (Song and Kang 2009) described in Eq. (2.8), one can 
easily find the new system vector that corresponds to the event in Eq. (2.11). The probability of 
this system event is computed as 4.1407×10−4 by the MSR analysis. 
In addition, the MSR method enables us to compute the sensitivities of the failure 
probability of the series system in Eq. (2.10) with respect to the means and standard deviations of 
(a) (b) 
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the random variables using the MSR method. Table 2.7 shows the sensitivity-based importance 
measures of the dominant random variables. 
 
Random variables , syssys j j
j
P   ,
sys
sys j j
j
P    
Young’s 
Modulus 
Rib (Inboard) −0.0614 0.00249 
Lower skin −1.0731 0.19713 
Front spar 1.1415 0.23371 
Middle spar 
(Inboard) −0.0641 0.00056 
Load scale 
factor 
Combination A 0.02004 0.0685 
Combination B 0.04757 0.1483 
Combination C 3.4817 5.5713 
Yield 
strength 
Front Spar −1.4894 0.38171 
Rib (Inboard) −0.00729 0.00348 
Lower skin −0.00155 0.00078 
 
Table 2.7 Sensitivities of failure probability of series system (× 10−2) 
 
2.4. Numerical Example II: Bridge Pylon 
2.4.1. Problem description 
This section provides another numerical example to demonstrate the proposed FE-SRA 
framework and FERUM-ABAQUS, a pylon structure of cable stayed bridge (Song et al. 2008, 
Kang et al. 2012), which is shown in Figure 2.7.  
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Figure 2.7 Pylon structure of cable stayed bridge 
 
The dimensions of the pylon structure are chosen based on an actual bridge design. The 
70-meter-long pylon has two symmetric arms, each of which consists of a main body with 
trapezoidal cross-section, 13 stiffeners, and 23 diaphragms. The dimensions of the left arm are 
shown in Figure 2.8. 
 
Z
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Figure 2.8 FE model of the left arm of the Pylon 
 
Real bridge structures are usually exposed to various kinds of loads. These loads are often 
combined into load cases based on possible loading scenarios. This example considers the 
following load combinations consisting of four types of design loads, i.e. dead load (D), live load 
(L), wind load in service (WL) and wind load out of service (W), which are widely used in 
bridge design practice: 
Load Combination 1 (LC1): D + L + WL 
Load Combination 2 (LC2): D + W                                                
(2.12)
The dead load (D) includes the self-weight and the pre-stress force of the cables. The live load (L) 
includes the loads caused by the traffic and the pedestrians. The in-service wind load (WL) 
represents the wind loads when the bridge is in service. The out-of-service wind load (W) models 
the wind loads when vehicles are prohibited to pass over the bridge due to the strong winds. In 
this example, the pylon structure is modeled independently from the entire bridge system by 
2.8m 
2.0m 
2.2m 
70.0m 
Diaphragms : 2 + 3@22 + 2m 
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giving proper boundary conditions: the bottom end of the pylon is assumed to be fixed, and a 
reasonable axial force, shear force, and moment are specified at the top end to describe the 
reactions to cable anchors. Figure 2.9 shows the free body diagrams of the pylon structure and 
boundary conditions for the four types of loads that are considered. 
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(i) Dead load (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Live load (L) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iii) In-service wind load 
(WL: In-plane & Out-of-plane) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iv) Out-of-service wind load  
(W: In-plane & Out-of-plane) 
 
Figure 2.9 Loads considered during component and system reliability analysis 
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In this example, a total of 19 random variables are considered: 6 for Young’s moduli, 6 
for yield strengths, and 7 for the load scale factors. Table 2.8 lists the means, c.o.v.’s, and the 
distribution types for these variables.  
 
 Mean c.o.v. Distribution Type 
Young’s modulus 2×108 (KN/m2) 0.05 
Normal 
Yield strength 2.6×105 (KN/m2) 0.05 
Load scale 
factor 
Dead load 1.0 0.10 
Live load 1.0 0.20 
Wind load 1.0 0.40 
 
Table 2.8 Statistical properties of random variables in pylon system 
 
Each of the two symmetric pylon arms is composed of one main body, 13 stiffeners, and 
23 diaphragms. Based on findings from preliminary FE reliability analyses, a single random 
variable is assigned to represent the uncertainty of Young’s modulus or yield strength for the 
whole set of diaphragms or stiffeners in each arm. This leads to 12 random variables representing 
Young’s moduli and yield strengths of two main bodies, two groups of diaphragms, and two 
groups of stiffeners. To describe uncertainty in the load intensities, random load scale factors are 
introduced. Two random scale factors for dead load (self-weight and pre-stress), one for live load, 
and four for wind loads (in-plane and out-of-plane directions for W and WL load cases) are 
assigned. Figure 2.9 shows these load components that appear in the four types of loads that are 
considered. In this example, all the random variables are assumed to be statistically independent 
except for the following cases: First, it is assumed that all parts (i.e. bodies, stiffeners, and 
diaphragms) are made of the same steel from the same manufacturer, and thus they are highly 
correlated. The correlation coefficient between Young’s moduli of different parts is assumed to 
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be 0.9. The same assumption is made for yield strengths of different parts. For the four load scale 
factors related to wind loads, i.e. W (in-plane), W (out-of-plane), WL (in-plane) and WL (out-of-
plane), the correlation coefficients for the pairs of loads are assumed as follows: 
(1) {W (in-plane), W (out-of-plane)} and {WL (in-plane), WL (out-of-plane)} : 0.8 
(2) {W (in-plane), WL (in-plane)} and {W (out-of-plane), WL (out-of-plane)}: 0.6 
(3) {W (in-plane), WL (out-of-plane)} and {W (out-of-plane), WL (in-plane)}: 0.48 
Like the previous wing box example, it is assumed that the material used in the pylon 
structure shows linear elastic behavior until it reaches the yielding stress limit. For simplicity, 
this example also considers the yielding failures only. A component failure event, which can be 
defined for each combination of a selected physical component and a load case, is described as 
Eq. (2.9). 
2.4.2. Analysis results 
As done in the wing box problem, for efficient system reliability analysis, significant component 
events are identified as follows. By deterministic FE simulations using the mean values of the 
random variables, the locations with local maximum Von-Mises stresses, i.e. “hot spots” are first 
identified. Filtering hot spots with insignificant levels of stresses, component failure events are 
defined at two hot spots for each arm. Considering two symmetric arms and two load cases, i.e. 
LC1 and LC2, a total of eight component failure events Ei, i = 1,…,8 are identified. See Table 2.9 
for the identified component events and the failure probabilities computed by component 
reliability analyses.  
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Component events  Failure probability (× 10–3) 
E1 (LC1; hot spot on right body) 3.4342 
E2 (LC1; hot spot on left body) 3.4189 
E3 (LC1; hot spot on right stiffener) 0.1332 
E4 (LC1; hot spot on left stiffener) 0.1340 
E5 (LC2; hot spot on right body) 5.4255 
E6 (LC2; hot spot on left body) 5.4079 
E7 (LC2; hot spot on right stiffener) 0.2910 
E8 (LC2; hot spot on left stiffener) 0.2925 
 
Table 2.9 Probabilities of component failure events by FORM analysis 
 
After FORM analysis by use of FEUM-ABAQUS, the components are described by 
standard normal random variables and reliability indexes, i.e. ,i iZ    i = 1,…,8. The 
components E3 and E4 are neglected during the system reliability analysis because they are less 
than 5% of the probability of the most dominant component E5. Using FORM, the sensitivities of 
the component event probabilities with respect to distribution parameters are also calculated. 
These component-level sensitivities in Eqs. (2.4a) and (2.4b) are used in calculating the 
sensitivities of the system failure probability in Eqs. (2.8a) and (2.8b) by use of the MSR method. 
In order to determine the statistical dependence between component events, the correlation 
coefficient matrix of 1 2 5 6 7, , , ,Z Z Z Z Z  and 8Z  is constructed as given in Table 2.10. 
 
Correlation Z1 Z2 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 
Z1 1 0.9887 0.6129 0.6040 0.6032 0.6032 
Z2  1 0.6040 0.6129 0.6032 0.6032 
Z5   1 0.9929 0.9826 0.9826 
Z6    1 0.9826 0.9826 
Z7  Symmetric  1 0.9906 
Z8      1 
 
Table 2.10 Correlation coefficient matrix of six component failure events 
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First, a series system event consisting of the six components is considered. The system 
failure probability is computed as 9.492×10–3. Comparison with the MCS result (109 samplings, 
c.o.v. 3.25×10–4), 9.404×10–3, the MSR method turns out to provide a sufficiently accurate 
estimate. In addition, the event that at least one yielding failure occurs by the load combination 2 
(LC2) while no failure occurs by LC1 is expressed as  
1 2 5 6 7 8( )sysE E E E E E E       (2.13)
The probability of this general system event is calculated as 5.633×10–3, which is also 
sufficiently accurate, revealed by comparing against the results from the MCS (109 samplings, 
c.o.v. 4.30×10–4), 5.368×10–3. Furthermore, Table 2.11 shows the sensitivity-based importance 
measures of the general system event in Eq. (2.13) estimated by the MSR method. 
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Random variables sysj j
j
P    
sys
j j
j
P    
Young’s 
modulus 
Diaphragm (Left) –2.558×10-22 –1.175×10-27 
Diaphragm (Right) –6.335×10-8 1.422×10-9 
Body (Left) –3.552×10-22 –2.279×10-27 
Body (Right) 7.887×10-6 –1.753×10-6 
Stiffener (Left) –4.140×10-25 –1.049×10-27 
Stiffener (Right) –7.817×10-6 –8.985×10-7 
Load 
scale 
factor 
Dead load (Self weight) 2.709×10-4 6.530×10-6 
Dead load (Pre-stress) 6.319×10-4 3.603×10-5 
Live load 2.596×10-3 1.919×10-3 
In-service wind load 
(In-plane) 7.690×10
-3 1.812×10-2 
In-service wind load 
(Out-of-plane) 1.452×10
-3 2.940×10-3 
Out-of-service wind load  
(In-plane) 1.372×10
-2 3.279×10-2 
Out-of-service wind load  
(Out-of-plane) 2.450×10
-3 5.235×10-3 
Yield 
strength  
Body (Left) –3.322×10-3 3.009×10-3 
Stiffener (Left) –4.495×10-14 8.093×10-5 
Diaphragm (Left) 0 0 
Body (Right) –3.710×10-3 2.964×10-3 
Stiffener (Right) –2.333×10-14 8.170×10-5 
Diaphragm (Right) 0 0 
 
Table 2.11 Sensitivity-based importance measures of the means and standard deviations of  
the random variables relative to series system probability 
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2.5. Summary 
In summary, a new framework for finite element system reliability analysis (FE-SRA) was 
proposed using the matrix-based system reliability (MSR) method, and an interface code, 
FERUM-ABAQUS, was developed as a computational platform of the system reliability analysis. 
In the framework, the reliability analysis package FERUM repeatedly calls ABAQUS® to obtain 
structural responses during a component reliability analysis, and a system reliability analysis is 
performed by use of the results of the individual reliability analyses in the component level. The 
proposed framework allows us to compute the probabilities of general system events and their 
sensitivities with respect to design parameters based on the results of the component-level FE 
reliability analyses. These sensitivities are often useful; for example, they facilitate using 
gradient-based optimizer for reliability-based design optimization (Nguyen et al. 2010b) and 
reliability-based topology optimization (Nguyen et al. 2010a, 2011). Also, FERUM-ABAQUS is 
a more versatile computing platform than other existing FE-RA software. By employing 
ABAQUS® which is specialized in FE analysis, FERUM can perform reliability analysis most 
accurately based on sophisticated FE analysis. Finally, the proposed framework and FERUM-
ABAQUS were successfully demonstrated through numerical examples of an aircraft wing 
torque box and a bridge pylon. 
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3. SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF FATIGUE-INDUCED SEQUENTIAL 
FAILURES BY BRANCH-AND-BOUND METHOD EMPLOYING SYSTEM 
RELIABILITY BOUNDS 
 
The development of an FE-SRA framework and interface code FERUM-ABQUS in Chapter 2 
enables us to perform reliability analysis for complex system failure event in conjunction with 
sophisticated FE simulations. As discussed in Chapter 1, reliability analysis of sequential failures 
additionally requires a method to perform selective search schemes using event-trees of potential 
failure sequences. This chapter introduces a new branch-and-bound method to perform system 
reliability analysis of fatigue-induced sequential failures accurately and efficiently. 
3.1. Literature Review 
A variety of structural systems are often subjected to the risk of sequential failures caused by 
fatigue (Byers et al. 1997, Karamchandani et al. 1992). These structural systems should be 
designed to have an sufficient structural redundancy so that local fatigue-induced failures do not 
progress toward exceedingly large damage such as system collapse. For example, it was reported 
that the capsizing of the drill platform “Alexander L. Kielland” in 1981 was initiated by a brace 
failure caused by a fatigue crack starting from a hydrophone support. The initial brace failure 
was followed by failures of other braces and eventually system collapse (Almar-Naess 1985, 
Moan 2005). Thus, in risk-informed decision-making on design, maintenance and retrofit for 
robust structural systems, it is essential to quantify the risk of fatigue-induced sequential failures 
and identify critical sequences of local failures. 
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A challenge in such reliability analysis is that the definition of system-level failure is not 
determined a priori, but identified through structural analyses while following an event-tree of 
potential sequences of failures. For a complex structural system, one might need to explore a 
large number of local failure sequences to obtain an accurate definition of the system failure. 
Moreover, quantifying the likelihood of each failure sequence requires component and system 
reliability analyses in conjunction with structural analyses in order to account for the effect of the 
load re-distributions and various uncertainties. Therefore, system reliability analysis of 
sequential fatigue-induced failures may require overwhelming computational cost. 
There have been several methodologies for performing system reliability analysis of 
sequential failures. Monte Carlo simulation (i.e. repeating computational simulations for many 
scenarios based on randomly-generated values of uncertain parameters) is the most 
straightforward and widely-used method (Ditlevsen and Bjerager 1989, Melchers 1994, Hu et al. 
1998); however, when structural analysis demands time-consuming computational simulations or 
the failure probabilities are low, the computational and time costs required for converged results 
can be exceedingly large. Therefore, researchers have developed various non-sampling-based 
methods such as incremental load method (Moses 1982), truncated enumeration method 
(Melchers and Tang 1984), -unzipping method (Thoft-Christensen and Murotsu 1986), and a 
method based on component importance factors (Gharaibeh et al. 2002). These methods perform 
selective search schemes using event-trees mostly based on the relative likelihoods of potential 
failure sequences. One of the most widely-used searching approaches is the so-called branch-
and-bound method (Murotsu 1984, Guenard 1984) that was introduced to identify critical 
sequences with significant likelihood in an efficient manner. Although many research efforts 
have been made to develop risk analysis methods based on the branch-and-bound approach 
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(Karsan and Kumar 1988, Karamchandani et al. 1992, Wang et al. 2006), these methods are still 
either time-consuming or prone to miss critical failure sequences. In addition, the methods may 
underestimate the risk due to heuristic rules or assumptions that were introduced to enhance their 
efficiency. 
According to Karamchandani et al. (1992), three techniques are commonly used to 
identify critical failure sequences: (1) deterministic search; (2) locally most-likely-to-fail-based 
search; and (3) branch-and-bound algorithm. First, the deterministic search approach (Thoft-
Christensen and Murotsu 1986, Gharaibeh et al. 2002) performs a deterministic structural 
analysis using the mean values of the random variables to identify a sequence of failures leading 
to structure collapse. To get additional sequences, one can modify the values of some variables 
and repeat the deterministic analysis. For example, one can strengthen sections or members 
(termed the “members” hereafter) that were involved in the identified sequence to search for 
additional failure sequences. However, this deterministic approach is prone to missing critical 
failure sequences because the sequences identified by this approach may not have the highest 
likelihood. 
The locally most-likely-to-fail-based search is a probabilistic extension of the 
deterministic search. The first step is to identify the member that is most likely to fail in the 
intact structure. A new structural analysis model is constructed to reflect the damage or failure of 
the identified member. Through component reliability analysis using the model, the most-likely-
to-fail member under the damage scenario is identified. This process is repeated until a system 
failure such as collapse is observed. This method can identify additional sequences by modifying 
some random variables, e.g., increasing the mean strength of a member that is involved in 
identified sequences. However, the sequences identified by this local search approach may not be 
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the most critical ones overall. For example, there may exists a member whose failure probability 
is lower than that of the most-likely-to-fail member, but the conditional probability of structure 
collapse given its failure can be fairly high. This important sequence may not be identified by the 
locally most-likely-to-fail-based search because it focuses only on the most-likely-to-fail 
members at each step. 
The branch-and-bound method (Murotsu 1984, Guenard 1984) is considered more 
accurate than the aforementioned methods. To identify system failure sequences that are 
“globally” most likely to occur, the method compares the probabilities of all the failure 
sequences that have been investigated during the search process and assumes further damage for 
the most likely sequence to continue the search. When the system failure of interest such as 
structural collapse is observed, the particular sequence is identified as a “system failure 
sequence.” Unless heuristic rules are introduced to truncate apparently insignificant sequences, 
the branch-and-bound method can identify system failure sequences in the decreasing order of 
their likelihood. This enables us to terminate the search process without ignoring significant 
system failure sequences. 
Although this selective search approach based on the probabilities of sequences helps 
reduce the number of sequences to explore, one still might need to explore a large number of 
sequences to obtain a reliable estimate on the structural system risk. This is due to the lack of 
reasonable criteria that would help terminate the search without underestimating the system-risk. 
The structural system failure event is often described as the union of the identified system failure 
sequences. During a search process, one can obtain a lower bound on the system failure 
probability by a system reliability analysis employing the identified failure sequences, which can 
be continuously updated as new failure sequences are identified. While the upper bound is 
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usually unknown, the trend of the lower bound updates alone cannot provide accurate 
termination criteria because the size of the updates on the lower bound caused by newly 
identified system failure sequences does not decrease monotonically due to the statistical 
dependence between identified failure sequences. This is the case even if the likelihood of 
identified sequences decreases monotonically. Therefore, a termination based on apparent 
convergence of the lower-bound may lead to underestimating the system risk. Moreover, one 
needs to perform a new system reliability analysis each time the lower-bound is updated. 
3.2. Branch-and-Bound Method Employing System Reliability Bounds (B3 method) 
A new branch-and-bound method employing system reliability bounds (termed the B3 method) is 
proposed to overcome the aforementioned challenges and to improve the efficiency and accuracy 
of risk analysis of a system with sequential failures. The search process of the B3 method 
identifies disjoint failure sequences in order to (1) obtain both the lower and upper bounds of the 
system failure probability; (2) achieve monotonic decrease in the size of identified failure 
sequences as the search process proceeds; and (3) update the bounds of the system risk without 
performing additional system reliability analyses. The development of the B3 method is two-
folds: (1) formulating limit state functions for disjoint failure sequences that can account for the 
interdependence between multiple crack growths through stress re-distributions; and (2) 
developing a branch-and-bound search scheme to systematically update the bounds on the 
system failure probability with reasonable termination criteria. 
3.2.1. Limit-state function formulations for disjoint failure sequences 
First, let us consider the following crack-growth model, which is often termed the Paris equation 
(Paris and Erdogan 1963): 
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 mKC
dN
da 
 
(3.1)
where a denotes the crack length, N is the number of load cycles, C and m are the material 
parameters, and ∆K denotes the range of the stress intensity factor. When considering cyclic 
zero-to-tension loading with constant amplitude, the range of stress intensity factor can be 
estimated by Newman’s approximation (Newman and Raju 1981) as follows: 
aaYSK  )(  (3.2)
where S denotes the far-field stress “range” and Y(a) is the “geometry” function. Other 
mathematical formulas such as the Walker equation (Walker 1970) and the Forman equation 
(Forman et al. 1967) can also be introduced to represent more general loading conditions. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this research, so the Paris equation in Eq. (3.2) is used for the 
following derivation. When substituting Eq. (3.2) into Eq. (3.1), one can obtain 
1
( )
m
m da C S dN
Y a a
   
 (3.3)
By integrating Eq. (3.3) from the initial condition to the current time point, the relationship 
between the time duration and the current crack length is derived as  
0
0
1
( )
a
m m
m
a
da C N S C T S
Y a a
        
  (3.4)
where a0 is the initial crack length, N is the total number of external loading applications with 
frequency ν0, and T denotes the time duration. Suppose a crack failure is defined as the event that 
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the length of a crack exceeds the critical crack length aic. In reality, it is a challenging issue to 
define the critical crack length, and one of the usual ways is to use the crack size measured when 
the stress intensity factor (K) reaches the fracture toughness (KC). Then, for a structure consisting 
of n structural members, the time required for the crack growth from ai0 to aic at the i-th member 
(i = 1, …, n), Ti0  is described as 
  0
0
0
0
1 1
( )
c
i
i
a
i m m s
ai
T da T
C S Y a a
    
  (3.5)
where ai0 and Si0 are the initial crack length and far-field stress range of the i-th member, 
respectively. The superscripts “0” in Ti0 and Si0 indicate that the structure has no preceding crack 
failures. Then, the limit-state function for the failure of the i-th member within an inspection 
cycle [0, Ts] is given as 
  0
0
0
0
1 1( )
( )
c
i
i
a
i i s m m s
ai
g T T da T
C S Y a a
      
X  (3.6)
where X  denotes the vector of random variables representing uncertainties in the parameters of 
the problem such as material properties (C, m) and initial crack length (ai0). In structural 
reliability analysis, “gi(X) ≤ 0” generally indicates the occurrence of a failure event. 
In order to identify the failure sequences as disjoint events (i.e. failure sequences that are 
mutually exclusive to each other) during the branch-and-bound search, let us first consider a 
scenario in which the i-th member fails before failures occur at any other members. This means 
that the time required to reach the critical crack length of the i-th member should be shorter than 
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those of the other members as well as the inspection cycle Ts. The probability of this scenario 
event is thus described as 
    0 0 0i i l i sl iP P T T T T        (3.7)
The event in Eq. (3.7) is a parallel system event consisting of n component events. The 
probability can be computed by a system reliability analysis employing the results by component 
reliability analyses of n individual events. Many existing methodologies mentioned in Section 
2.2.2 are applicable to solve the parallel-system reliability problem. 
Next, the probability that the j-th member fails following the failure of the i-th member is 
described as 
        0 0 0 0,i i i ij i l i s j m i j sl i m i jP P T T T T T T T T T                    (3.8)
where Tji  denotes the inter-failure time required for the crack failure at the j-th member since the 
failure at the i-th. Since Ti0 is always smaller than (Ti0+ Tji), the second term in Eq. (3.8) can be 
eliminated, i.e.  
      0 0,i i i ij i l j m i j sl i m i jP P T T T T T T T                  (3.9)
This can be generalized to failure sequences involving more than two member failures. For 
example, the probability of the progressive failure of the sequence {12…(i –1)i} is 
described as 
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 (3.10)
where Ti1,…,(i-1) denotes the time required for the failure at the i-th member since the sequential 
failure {12…(i–1) }. 
Unlike Ti0 in Eq. (3.5), i.e. the time until the first local failure for an undamaged structure, 
the inter-failure time terms for damaged structures (such as Ti1,…,(i-1) in Eq. (3.10)) should be 
computed with the effects of load re-distributions considered. For convenient derivation of such 
time terms in terms of random variables, a recursive formulation is developed as follows. 
Consider an auxiliary “damage” function 
0
1( )
( )
a
m
a
a da
Y a a
   
  (3.11)
For example, let us consider the failure sequence {12}. From Eq. (3.4), it is seen that 
1 0 0 0
2 2 0 1 2( ) ( ) ( )
ma a C T S       (3.12a)
1 1 1
2 2 0 2 2( ) ( ) ( )
c ma a C T S      (3.12b)
where a21 denotes the crack length at the member 2 at the moment the crack failure occurs at the 
member 1. Eqs. (3.12a) and (3.12b) respectively represent the growth of the crack at the member 
2 before and after the crack failure occurs at the member 1. Summing up Eqs. (3.12a) and 
(3.12b), one obtains 
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0 1 1 0 0
2 2 0 2 2 0 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
c m ma a C T S C T S       (3.13)
Solving Eq. (3.13) for T21, 
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 
 (3.14)
It is noteworthy that the ratio of the far-field stress of the intact condition to that of the damaged 
state, S20/S21, incorporates the effect of the load re-distribution caused by the failure at member 1. 
Similarly, the time required for the crack failure at member 3 since the sequential failures {12} 
is derived as 
3
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0 1
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m m
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mm a
S SdaT T T
C S S SY a a
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  (3.15)
Through mathematical induction, a recursive formulation is derived for a general failure 
sequence {12…  (i –1) i} as follows: 
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ma ki
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i m ki m k
ko i ia
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
         
  (3.16)
Using Eq. (3.16), the time terms in Eq. (3.10) can be described in terms of deterministic and 
random parameters for any failure sequence. 
48 
 
The system failure sequences identified by a search process based on the limit-state 
formulation in Eq. (3.10) are disjoint (or mutually exclusive to each other) because of the events 
describing the order of the failure events, e.g., 0 0( ).i l
l i
T T
 
  Therefore, the system failure 
probability can be calculated by summing up the probabilities of the identified failure sequences 
without additional system reliability analysis to account for the statistical dependence between 
the sequences, i.e.  
11
( ) ( )
fs fsN N
sys i i
ii
P E P C P C

        (3.17)
where Ci (i=1,…,Nfs) denotes the identified system failure sequences and Nfs denotes the total 
number of the identified failure sequences. The probability of a system failure sequence, P(Ci), is 
obtained by a system reliability analysis using Eq. (3.10). This disjoint-event-based formulation 
enables the aforementioned merits of the B3 method. Although the formulation was derived 
based on the Paris equation and Newman’s approximation, this framework can be applied to 
other analytical crack-growth models based on far-field stress, if necessary. 
3.2.2. Systematic search scheme of the B3 method 
The proposed B3 method uses a systematic search scheme that employs the aforementioned 
disjoint cut-set formulation and recursive limit-state functions. The search process is explained in 
detail as follows using an example in Figure 3.1.  
 
49 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Search procedure by B3 method 
 
First, the lower and upper bounds of the system failure probability (denoted by Plow and 
Pupp) are set to be zero and one, respectively. These bounds are continuously updated as the 
search process identifies cases of system failures and non-failures and computes their 
probabilities. The search process starts with a node that contains all of the possible scenarios 
(“initial node”, shown at the far left in the figure). This is considered one of the “mixed” nodes, 
which are given as gray nodes in Figure 3.1. Mixed nodes contain both system failure and non-
failure cases. The stress distribution of the intact structure is obtained by a structural analysis. 
Next, a “branching” process is performed to find the probabilities of individual member 
failures from the current structural condition, i.e. Pi in Eq. (3.7). If the structural condition 
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represented by a current node has n structural members (or locations) of potential crack failures, 
this branching process transfers the probability in the current “parent” node to the (n+1) “child” 
nodes as shown in the second column of the nodes in Figure 3.1. As a result, the current “parent” 
node becomes “inactive,” i.e. stops contributing to the system probability calculations. Each of 
the first n child nodes, i.e. “1” through “n” in the figure, contains the probability that the 
corresponding member fails “first” (i.e. earlier than the others) during the given inspection cycle 
Ts. These are new “mixed” nodes and their probabilities are computed by system reliability 
analysis using Eq. (3.7). By contrast, the last “white” node, i.e. “0” in the figure, indicates the 
case that no further failure occurs during the inspection cycle. Since these (n+1) child nodes are 
mutually exclusive (or disjoint) and collectively exhaustive (MECE) events given the condition 
of their parent node, the probability of the white node is computed by the probability of the 
parent node minus the sum of the probabilities of all the other child nodes branching out from the 
parent node. The upper bound is now decreased by the probability of the white node. This is the 
“bounding” process to update the upper bound of the system failure probability. 
The next step is to compare all the active mixed nodes and find the one with the highest 
probability. Then, a new structural analysis is performed using a structural model representing 
the damage scenario of the active mixed node with the highest probability. If the structural 
analysis reveals that the selected node represents a system failure case (“black” nodes in Figure 
3.1), Plow is increased by the probability of the node, which is understood from Eq. (3.17). It is 
noted that the probability of the node has been already computed during the previous branching 
process. This is another “bounding” process to update the lower bound of the system failure 
probability. On the other hand, if the node with the highest probability does not represent a 
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system failure case, the aforementioned branching process is performed for the node to find the 
probabilities of the child nodes originating from the node. 
For the example in Figure 3.1, suppose the node “2”, i.e. the structure with member “2” 
damaged, has a higher probability than the other active mixed nodes and the structural analysis 
on the damage condition does not indicate a system failure. Then, a branching process is 
performed to find the probabilities of the sequences {21}, {23}, …, and {2n} by system 
reliability analysis using Eq. (3.9). After the branching process, the upper bound is decreased by 
the probability of “2-0.” Now, the probabilities of all the remaining active nodes “1”, “3”, …, 
“n”, “2-1”, “2-3”, …, and “2-n” are compared. Suppose the node “2-3” has the highest 
probability and a structural analysis with members 2 and 3 failed identifies a system failure event. 
The node becomes a system failure (“black”) node, and the lower bound of the system failure 
probability is increased by the probability of the current node, “2-3.” Then, the next most likely 
active node (e.g., “2-n” in Figure 3.1) is selected to perform another structural analysis. 
This iterative process of “branching” and “bounding” continues until the following 
termination criteria are satisfied. If finding the most critical paths is the main interest, one can 
stop the search process when the most recently identified system failure sequence has a 
probability lower than a given threshold, or when a desirable number of system failure sequences 
are identified. This is possible because the B3 method guarantees finding the failure sequences in 
the decreasing order of their probabilities. On the other hand, if estimating the system failure 
probability is of interest, the process can be terminated when the width of the bounds is 
negligible compared to the overall risk level estimated from the bounds. The search procedure of 
the B3 method is explained by a flow chart in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Flowchart of B3 method search procedure 
 
The B3 method does not rely on an arbitrary definition of system failure such as “x 
number of member failures (at y location) constitute a system failure,” (Karamchandani et al. 
1992, Shabakhty et al. 2003), but identifies system failures during the search procedure with help 
of computational simulations. Unlike the deterministic search and locally most-likely-to-fail-
based search methods, the B3 method performs a global search and identifies critical paths in the 
decreasing order of their probabilities. This is because the proposed search scheme performs a 
new structural analysis for the most likely node among all active mixed nodes. Moreover, the 
Structural analysis of intact structure to find Si0, i =1,…,n 
Branching: Compute probabilities of child nodes by 
system reliability analysis; the current node becomes 
Bounding*: Update the upper bound Pupp 
Find the most likely active node 
Initialization: Plow = 0, Pupp = 1 
Yes 
No 
Structural analysis of damaged structure 
 System failure observed? 
Bounding*: Update the lower bound Plow 
* : Check the termination criteria 
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analytical search framework decreases the required number of structural analyses compared to 
Monte Carlo simulation approaches, especially for low-probability system risk. 
The main difference between the B3 method and existing branch-and-bound-based 
methods is that the proposed method describes a system event by use of mutually exclusive (or 
disjoint) failure modes. By contrast, when a branch-and-bound method uses a non-disjoint cut-set 
formulation, the probability of a failure sequence is computed without considering the 
likelihoods of specific orders. For example, the probability of a sequence {12…  i –1 i} 
would be computed as 
      1,..., 1 0 0 1 0 1 1,..., 11 1 2 1 2i ii s s i sP P T T T T T T T T T            (3.18)
This is simplified as 
  1,..., 1 0 1 1,..., 11 2i ii i sP P T T T T      (3.19)
Compared to the corresponding formulation of the B3 method in Eq. (3.10), this probability is 
easier to obtain because one can compute this probability by a component reliability analysis 
rather than a system reliability analysis. However, the identified failure paths are non-disjoint 
and correlated, so the lower bound on the system failure probability should be computed by a 
system reliability analysis for the union of all identified failure paths, i.e.  
1
idN
low i
i
P P E

      (3.20)
where Ei is the occurrence of the i-th identified system failure sequence (i = 1,…,Nid) that 
appears in Eq. (3.19), and Nid is the total number of system failure modes identified by the 
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branch-and-bound search. By contrast, the B3 method updates the lower bound just by adding the 
probability of newly identified system failure sequences to the current bound. Moreover, the B3 
method can provide the upper bound as well, which helps provide reasonable termination criteria 
for the search process. 
In the existing methods, even though a branch-and-bound method can identify critical 
failure sequences in a decreasing order of their probabilities (unless heuristic or problem-
dependent truncation rules are introduced), the increments of the bounds caused by newly 
identified system failure sequences are not decreasing monotonically. This is due to the statistical 
dependence between the failure sequences. However, in the B3 method, the increments of the 
lower bound are the same as the probabilities of the identified system failure cases, which are 
found in the decreasing order. Therefore, the increments on lower bound are diminishing 
monotonically, which helps avoid continuing the search process unnecessarily. 
To achieve the aforementioned merits of the disjoint-cut-set formulation, the B3 method 
needs to perform more component and system reliability analyses than conventional branch-and-
bound methods. Considering the efficiency in the search process and accuracy in system failure 
probability calculations, this additional task is worthwhile especially when the computational 
cost of the structural or finite element analysis is dominant. The component reliability analysis 
method used in the B3 method should be able to identify the statistical dependence between the 
component events such that a system reliability analysis can be later performed with the 
dependence fully considered. The system reliability analysis method should be able to compute 
the probability of parallel systems accurately. In particular, the method should be able to handle 
parallel systems with a large number of component events because the number of component 
events quickly increases as the search process goes on. In this research, The First-Order 
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Reliability Method (FORM) and the Second-order Reliability Method (SORM) are employed. 
Both of them are widely-used component reliability analysis methods that can describe the 
dependence between component events using the normalized gradient vectors at the most 
probable failure points. A comprehensive review on these methods can be found in Der 
Kiureghian (2005). For the system reliability analysis, we use the multivariate normal integral 
method by Genz (1992) that can provide accurate estimation on the probabilities of large-size 
parallel systems using quasi-random integration points. 
3.3. Illustrative Example: Multi-layer Daniels System 
Daniels (1945) investigated the reliability of a bundle of ideally brittle wires that had identical 
and deterministic elastic moduli subjected to a deterministic load. In the example, wire strengths 
were assumed to be uncertain and statistically independent. It was also assumed that the 
deterministic load was equally distributed among the remaining wires. The system fails when all 
the members/wires fail. Based on these assumptions, the exact failure probability of the 
structural system was derived. This “Daniels system” is often used as a numerical example in 
developing and testing new system reliability analysis methods (Song and Der Kiureghian 2003, 
Straub and Der Kiureghian 2007, Kang et al. 2012, Gharaibeh et al. 2002, Lee and Song 2011a, 
b). The system failure event of a Daniels system is a complex system event because of the load 
re-distributions caused by member failures. In this chapter, the risk of fatigue-induced sequential 
failures of a multi-layer Daniels system (see Figure 3.3) is investigated to illustrate the proposed 
B3 method. In this example, the system failure is defined as an event that all the wires in one of 
the three stories fail. 
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Figure 3.3 A multi-layer Daniels system 
 
3.3.1. Problem description 
As shown in Figure 3.3, the structure consists of six bars that are assumed to be perfectly brittle 
and to have identical, deterministic elastic moduli. The cross sectional areas of the bars are 
assumed to be A1=0.03m2, A2=A3=0.015m2, and A4=A5=A6=0.01mm2. In this example, the 
uncertainties of C in Paris equation, initial crack length ai0, and external load are described by 
random variables with the mean values 1.202×10−13 (mm/cycle/(MPa·mm)m), 0.11 (mm) and 
1,200 (kN), respectively. For the sake of simplicity, all of the random variables are assumed to 
follow lognormal distribution with the coefficient of variation (c.o.v.) of 0.1 and to be 
statistically independent of each other. The following deterministic parameters are used: the 
loading frequency (ν0): 500,000 (cycle/year), the inspection cycle (Ts): 4 years, m=3, Y(a)=3, and 
the critical crack lengths: a1c=30mm, a2c=a3c=15mm, and a4c= a5c= a6c=10mm. Assuming the 
1
2 3
4 5 6
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load is equally distributed over remaining bars on each story, the stress in each bar is calculated 
by dividing the external load 1,200 (kN) by the sum of the cross sectional areas of the remaining 
bars. In this illustrative example for the B3 method, these simple stress calculations constitute 
“structural analyses,” which were aforementioned in describing the B3 method. In applying the 
B3 method to real-scale complex structural systems, the computational costs for structural 
analyses become dominant during the search process. 
3.3.2. B3 method application 
As the first step, the lower bound Plow and upper bound Pupp values are initialized as 0 and 1, 
respectively. As shown in Figure 3.4, a branching is performed to compute the probability that 
the i-th member fails “first” in the intact structure during the inspection cycle [0, Ts] as in Eq. 
(3.7). 
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Figure 3.4 Results of the first branching 
 
For example, the probability that the 6th member fails within the inspection cycle and 
earlier than the other members, i.e. the probability of the node “6” in Figure 3.4, is calculated by 
    0 0 06 6 66 , for 1,...,5l slP P T T T T l         (3.21)
The component events in the parallel system in Eq. (3.22) are described as follows.  
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(3.22b)
        No additional failures 
       System failure 
       Mixed (active) 
       Mixed (inactive) 0 
Initial 
node 
 
1 
6 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
0.0748 
0.1215 
0.1215 
0.1739 
0.1739 
0.1739 
0.1605 
0 
Pupp=0.8395 Plow=0 
1
2 3
4 5 6 
59 
 
Preliminary analyses revealed that the nonlinearity of the limit-state functions in Eq. (3.22) may 
cause significant errors in component reliability analyses by FORM. Although SORM helps 
reduce the errors significantly, it is not desirable to use SORM for every component reliability 
analysis problem due to larger computational cost. Karamchandani et al. (1992) claimed the last 
component event in Eq. (3.21) (i.e. Eq. (3.22b)) governs the system probability and proposed to 
ignore the other components in evaluating the probability. To achieve reasonable accuracy 
without compromising computational efficiency, therefore, we employ FORM for all component 
events that do not involve Ts while we compute the probability of the last limit-state function, Eq. 
(3.22b), using SORM for accurate estimations. The results from this mixed approach will be 
presented and discussed in the following numerical examples through comparison with those by 
crude Monte Carlo simulations. 
Next, using the first-order concept of system reliability (Hohenbichler and Rackwitz 
1983), the probabilities of parallel systems such as the one in Eq. (3.21) are computed by 
evaluating a multi-variate normal integral. A parallel system with n component events is 
computed as follows.  
1
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n
i n
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n
P g d
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

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
        
(3.23)
where   is the domain of the parallel system event defined in the space of n standard normal 
random variables in Z, φ ( )n   is the joint probability density function of Z, R is the correlation 
60 
 
coefficient matrix of Z, and det R denotes the determinant of R. The component reliability 
indexes βi, i=1,…,n are obtained by FORM and SORM. The correlation coefficient matrix R can 
be determined from the inner products of negative normalized gradient vectors (Der Kiureghian 
2005) evaluated at the design points, which are again obtained by FORM. In this thesis, the 
multivariate normal integral method by Genz (1992) is used for evaluating these multi-variate 
normal integrals efficiently, even for the cases with a large number of component events. The 
MSR method is also applicable here. As previously stated, the B3 method entails many parallel 
system analyses, which made the method by Genz optimal in the numerical examples in this 
paper. 
Figure 3.4 shows the outcomes of the first branching, i.e. the probabilities of seven child 
nodes. Due to the given conditions and assumptions, the node numbers corresponding to the bars 
in the same layer show the same probabilities. The probability of the last white node is computed 
by the probability of the parent node (i.e. 1.0) minus the sum of the probabilities of the first six 
child nodes. The upper bound is decreased by this probability, i.e. Pupp=1−0.1605=0.8395. Now 
the probability of the initial node (i.e. 1.0) is transferred to its child nodes, which makes the 
initial node inactive. It is noted that only one structural analysis is required per branching 
regardless of the number of the child nodes. 
For the second branching, the active mixed nodes with the highest probabilities are 
identified. In this example, nodes “4”, “5”, and “6” have the highest probability. Any of the 
nodes with the same probability can be selected for the next branching and this does not affect 
the final result. Suppose the node “6” is selected. The corresponding structural member (i.e. the 
bar “6”) is removed from the system. Since the structure still survives, a structural analysis is 
performed to find the stresses after the load re-distribution caused by the failure of the bar. The 
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second branching is performed based on the results of the structural analysis. The outcomes of 
this branching are shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Results after the second branching 
 
As a result of the second branching, node “6” becomes inactive, and the upper bound of 
system probability is further decreased by the probability of node “6-0.” For the third branching, 
we need to find the active mixed node with the highest probability. With the local searching 
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technique discussed in Section 3.2, the next branching would start from node “6-4” or “6-5.” 
However, the branch-and-bound algorithm compares all active mixed nodes and chooses node “4” 
or “5” for the branching. After four more times of branching and four corresponding structural 
analyses, the event tree is expanded as shown in Figure 3.6.  
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Figure 3.6 Results after six times of branching 
 
        No additional failures 
       System failure 
       Mixed (active) 
       Mixed (inactive) 
0 
Initial 
node 
 
1 
 
0.0748 
0.1605 
6-0
6-4
6-5
6 
0.0526 
0.0526 
0.0534 
5-0
5-4
5-6 0.0526 
0.0534 
0.0526 
4-0
4-5
4-6 0.0526 
0.0534 
0.0526 
3-0
3-2 0.0831 
0.0254 
2-0
0.0831 
0.0254 
3 
4 
5 
2 
0
Pupp=0.6285 Plow=0 
6-05-0 2-0 
1 
2 3 
4 5 6 
2-3
64 
 
In the figure, only some of the active mixed nodes with relatively higher probability are 
displayed. Nodes “2-3” and “3-2” have the highest probabilities, so the next branching starts 
from one of these nodes. Suppose node “2-3” is selected for the next branching. However, this 
case causes system failure because all the bars in the second layer are disconnected. Therefore, 
node “2-3” is identified as the system failure node and the lower bound is increased by its 
probability (see Figure 3.7). 
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Figure 3.7 The first identification of system failure sequence 
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It is noteworthy that each structural analysis leads to either another branching or a system 
failure case identification, which decreases the upper bound or increases the lower bound. In 
other words, every structural analysis performed during the B3-based search contributes to 
narrowing the bounds of the system failure probability. In this example, the iterative process is 
terminated when the gap of the bounds becomes smaller than a prescribed percentage of the 
upper bound. Figure 3.8 shows the updates of the bounds with the number of “structural analyses” 
during the search. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Updating of the bounds by the B3 method 
 
When the width of the bounds reaches 1% of the upper bound value, the lower and upper 
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structural analyses. To verify this result, crude Monte Carlo simulations are performed. For each 
set of generated random variables, the system failure/non-failure is checked by performing 
structural analyses while following an event tree of load re-distributions. After 107 simulations, 
the system failure probability is estimated as 6.050×10−3 with a coefficient of variation (c.o.v.) of 
4.053×10−3, which belongs to the interval by the B3 analysis. The average number of structural 
analyses for each Monte Carlo simulation is 1.017. Therefore, it is obvious that this sampling 
approach can be time-consuming or intractable especially when the computational cost of 
structural analyses are dominant. 
It is noted that the upper bound curve becomes almost flat relatively early in the search, 
at a level fairly close to the exact system failure probability by Monte Carlo simulations. This is 
because, as the search proceeds, structural analyses are performed for systems with more damage 
and less redundancy, which lead to more “system failure” cases and thus most of the following 
updates are made on the lower bound. Even if non-failure is observed and thus branching is 
performed, the proportion of the white node decreases as the system loses its redundancy. 
Therefore, in most cases, it is not necessary to wait until the bounds converge to each other too 
closely. For example, the upper bound reaches 6.067×10−3 only after 48 structural analyses in 
this study. The corresponding lower bound is 5.772×10−3 and the gap of the bounds is 5% of the 
upper bound value. The bounds achieved at the 5% gap termination point (i.e. when the gap is 5% 
of the upper bound) show enough accuracy in predicting the level of the system failure 
probability when compared to those at the 1% gap termination point. This means further search 
beyond the 5% termination point may harm the efficiency of the analysis unnecessarily. In other 
words, the 5% gap seems to allow for an optimal trade-off between accuracy and efficiency, and 
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we experienced similar trends in other examples. Therefore, in the following numerical examples, 
the B3 search will be terminated when the gap of the bounds reaches 5% of the upper bound. 
Another important objective of the B3 analysis is to identify critical system failure 
sequences efficiently. Table 3.1 shows the first twelve critical failure sequences identified by the 
B3 method along with the probabilities of the sequences by the B3 method and by crude Monte 
Carlo simulations. The entire set of critical failure paths identified until the 5% termination point 
is shown in Figure 3.9 following the order of their identification during the search. These results 
demonstrate that the B3 method identifies critical failure sequences in the decreasing order of 
their probabilities, which allows us to terminate the search without missing critical failure 
sequences. 
 
Failure 
sequence 
Probability by  
B3 method (×10−4) 
Probability by  
Monte Carlo simulation (×10−4) 
2 → 3 8.31 7.90 
3 → 2 8.31 8.20 
1 7.48 7.49 
4 → 5 → 6 4.94 4.90 
4 → 6 → 5 4.94 4.44 
5 → 4 → 6 4.94 4.89 
5 → 6 → 4 4.94 4.92 
6 → 4 → 5 4.94 5.26 
6 → 5 → 4 4.94 5.06 
4 → 1 0.39 0.37 
5 → 1 0.39 0.38 
6 → 1 0.39 0.39 
 
Table 3.1 Identified critical system failure sequences and probabilities 
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Figure 3.9 Probabilities of critical system failure sequences identified up to 5% termination 
point 
 
3.4. Numerical Example: Three-dimensional Tripod Jacket Structure 
In order to test the applicability of the proposed method to large-size complex structural systems, 
a three-dimensional tripod jacket structure consisting of 66 members in Figure 3.10 is considered. 
This type of offshore truss structures have been widely used in many research efforts for the 
system reliability analysis of fatigue-induced sequential failures. A benchmark structure of tripod 
offshore platform in Karamchandani et al. (1991) and (1992) is adopted in this example and 
slightly modified to facilitate testing the proposed method. 
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Figure 3.10 Three-dimensional tripod jacket structure 
 
3.4.1. Structural configuration and loading 
As shown in Figure 3.10, the target structure has a triangular plan with a height of 76 meters. 
The supports at the bottom are located at the corners of an equilateral triangle with sides of 30 
meters. The lengths of the sides decrease linearly over the height and are finally reduced to 10 
meters at the top. The structure has hollow section pipes with a variety of perimeter and 
thickness as shown in the figure. For example, “650×30” in the figure denotes a hollow section 
with a perimeter of 650 mm and a thickness of 30 mm. The cross sectional area of each member 
is calculated by the product of the perimeter and thickness. For the sake of simplicity, the 
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geometry function Y(a) is assumed to be 3.0. Paris equation parameters C and m, and the initial 
crack lengths are described by random variables as described in the following section. 
The 70-meter-long bottom portion of the structure is in the sea water. Single cyclic 
horizontal loading is applied at the sea level of the column “2” as illustrated in Figure 3.10. For 
the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the dynamic loading has constant amplitude, and the 
uncertainty in the amplitude is described by a random load-scale factor I. It is also assumed that 
each steel truss member shows linear elastic behavior until a crack failure occurs. This 
assumption is apprehensible because most fatigue-induced failures are caused by relatively low-
level stresses. Based on these assumptions, a deterministic structural analysis is performed for 
each damaged/undamaged condition considered during the search, and the calculated member 
stresses are multiplied by the uncertain load-scale factor I during the reliability analyses. The 
loading frequency (ν0) and the inspection cycle (Ts) are given as 500,000/year and 4 years, 
respectively, and these parameters are assumed to be deterministic. 
3.4.2. Statistical parameters 
The uncertainties by random variables are described in a similar manner to the original example 
in  Karamchandani et al. (1991, 1992) except for the Paris-equation parameters C and m. 
Kirkemo (1988) considered the following assumptions, i.e. (1) m and C are both deterministic, (2) 
m is deterministic, but C is uncertain, (3) C is deterministic, but m is uncertain, (4) m and C are 
both uncertain and described by uncorrelated random variables, and (5) m and C are both 
uncertain and described by negatively correlated random variables. It was recommended to use 
approaches (2) and (5) for a reasonable representation of the reality (Kirkemo 1988). Therefore, 
in this thesis, these two cases are considered as Case I and Case II, respectively. Case II 
considers uncertainties in both m and C whereas in Case I the given mean value of m will be 
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used as a deterministic parameter. Uncertainties in the initial crack lengths (a0) and the load-
scale factor (I) are also considered. 
The statistical properties of the random variables are summarized in Table 2. The values 
of these statistical parameters were determined based on a comprehensive literature survey 
(Kirkemo 1988, Moan et al. 1993, Millwater et al. 1994, Moan and Song 2000, Shabakhty et al. 
2003, Ayala-Uraga and Moan 2007, Moan and Ayala-Uraga 2008). In both cases, one random 
variable I  is used to describe the uncertainty in the loading. Each of 66 members in Cases I and 
II has two (C and a0) or three (C, m, and a0) random variables, respectively. Therefore, a total of 
133 and 199 random variables are used for Cases I and II, respectively. All random variables are 
assumed to be statistically independent of each other except for the following cases for which 
non-zero correlation coefficients are assigned: (1) between Paris equation parameters (C) of two 
different members (correlation coefficient 0.6); (2) between Paris equation parameters (m) of two 
different members (correlation 0.6); (3) between initial crack lengths (a0) of two different 
members (correlation 0.6); and (4) between C and m of two different or the same members 
(correlation −0.2). 
 
Random variables Mean c.o.v. Distribution type 
Number of 
random variables 
C  1.202×10−13 0.533 Lognormal 66 
m 3.0 0.02 Lognormal 66 
a0 (mm) 0.11 1.0 Exponential 66 
I 1.0 0.1 Lognormal 1 
 
Table 3.2 Statistical properties of random variables 
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3.4.3. Component and system failure definition 
It is assumed that a section fails when its crack length reaches the thickness of the section. Upon 
the occurrence of the section failure, the corresponding member is removed from the structural 
analysis model, which causes stress re-distribution. As for the system failure definition, most of 
the existing research employed some heuristic system failure criteria such as “the target structure 
collapses if any pair of members fail” or “the system fails if one leg member fails” 
(Karamchandani et al. 1992). As an attempt to accurately identify system failure cases via 
structural analyses instead of heuristic criteria, in this example, the following system failure 
criteria are checked after each structural analysis during a B3-based search. The occurrence of 
any of these criteria constitutes system failure. 
 
(1) Global statistical determinacy or instability condition: 3 × (number of nodes) – 
(number of members) – (number of reaction DOFs) > 0. 
(2) Local instability condition: less than three members are connected to a non-supporting 
node. 
(3) Condition of global stiffness matrix: the condition number of global stiffness matrix is 
exceedingly large compared to that of the intact structure. 
(4) Unreasonably large displacement occurs. 
 
It should be noted that this is an example of system failure criteria that can be used during a B3 
search. One can define a set of system failure criteria based on the objectives and safety concerns 
of a target structure of interest. For example, for many offshore structures, extreme loading is 
another important factor which may cause structural failures such as yielding (Karamchandani et 
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al. 1991). As stated above, the overloading failure can be introduced as a system failure 
definition in the B3 method, which represents an apprehensible failure scenario that initial local 
failures occur from fatigue and the subsequent load re-distribution causes extreme loading and 
system failure. In order to introduce overloading failure as a criterion of local failure and 
consider the interaction between fatigue and overload failures, the B3 formulations in Section 3.1 
needs to be further developed to describe failures under extreme loading also as disjoint events, 
which will be an important future research topic. 
3.4.4. Computational framework 
Figure 3.11 illustrates the computational framework of the B3 analysis for the three-dimensional 
tripod jacket structure.  As shown in the figure, the B3 framework consists of three elements: 
branch-and-bound algorithm, structural analysis, and (component and system) reliability analysis. 
For the target truss structure, a structural analysis code for linear elastic behavior was made in 
MATLAB®. Computer codes for the branch-and-bound process and reliability analysis were 
also developed in MATLAB®. The methods employed for component and system reliability 
analysis (i.e., FORM, SORM, and a method by Genz) were discussed in Section 3.4.2. 
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Figure 3.11 Computational framework of B3 analysis for tripod jacket structure 
 
During the B3 analysis, the main part in charge of branching and bounding repeatedly 
requires structural analysis and reliability analysis. If a damage condition is identified as a 
system failure case through structural analysis, the lower bound increases. If it is identified as a 
non-failure case, branching is made from the node representing the damage condition, and the 
member stresses obtained from the structural analysis are provided to the reliability analysis so 
that the probabilities of the new failure sequences can be calculated. 
3.4.5. Analysis results 
This section presents the results of B3 analyses for Cases I and II. The results are compared to 
those by conventional branch-and-bound approach (i.e. based on non-disjoint failure sequences) 
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in both cases. First of all, Figure 3.12 shows the updates of the upper and lower bounds by the B3 
method and those of the lower bound by the conventional branch-and-bound-based approach (i.e. 
Eq. (3.20)) with the number of structural analyses.  
 
 
Figure 3.12 Bounds by B3 method and conventional approach (Case I) 
 
The lower and upper bound by the B3 method at 5% gap termination point are 1.656×10−3 
and 1.739×10−3 respectively with only 26 FE analyses. The system failure probability estimated 
by crude Monte Carlo simulation with one million samples is 1.734×10−3, with a c.o.v. of 
2.40×10−2, which belongs to the interval by the B3 method and is close to the upper bound as 
observed in the multi-layer Daniels system example. 
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At the same termination point, the lower bound by the conventional method is 
1.676×10−3, which is a seemingly good result. However, as the trend in the figure shows, the 
approach has a couple of drawbacks in terms of search termination. First, it is not guaranteed that 
the updates in the lower bound diminish monotonically even though the system failure sequences 
are identified in the decreasing order of their likelihoods. This is because of the impact of the 
statistical dependence between the failure sequences on the system failure probability in Eq. 
(3.20). For example, the curve of the lower bound becomes almost flat after 10 structural 
analyses. Since the upper bound is usually not available for the conventional approach, the 
search procedure is often terminated when the lower bound converges. Therefore the flat trend 
may result in underestimation of system failure probability. Second, the lower bound of the 
conventional approach requires more structural analyses for the convergence than the bounds by 
the B3 method. For example, even after 50 structural analyses, the lower bound does not increase 
much from an earlier flat trend. By contrast, the lower bound by the B3 method increases 
monotonically and converges to the upper bound at around the exact solution after 50 structural 
analyses. Sometimes, the incremental amount of lower bound is even negative due to the 
numerical error from simulation which is introduced to solve the general cut-set system in Eq. 
(3.21).  These two issues are more clearly shown in Case II. 
Figure 3.13 shows the probabilities of critical system failure sequences identified until 
the 5% termination point of the B3 analysis. This once again confirms that the failure modes are 
identified in the decreasing order of their probabilities. Furthermore, Figure 3.14 displays the 
first four system failure sequences that satisfy the system failure criteria described in Section 
3.4.3. In the figure, each thick bar indicates a failed member. The probability of each sequence is 
78 
 
also verified by a comparison with crude Monte Carlo simulations (one million samples). Only 9 
structural analyses were required to identify these failure sequences. 
 
Figure 3.13 Critical system failure sequences identified until 5% termination point (Case I) 
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Figure 3.14 Four major system failure sequences (Case I) 
 
1st failure sequence 
Probability by B3 method: 6.85×10−4 
Probability by simulation:  6.60×10−4 
System failure modes*: (3) and (4) 
2nd failure sequence 
Probability by B3 method: 6.85×10−4 
Probability by simulation:  6.75×10−4 
System failure modes*: (4) 
3rd failure sequence 
Probability by B3 method: 9.00×10−5 
Probability by simulation:  9.70×10−5 
System failure modes*: (4) 
4th failure sequence 
Probability by B3 method: 8.50×10−5 
Probability by simulation:  8.70×10−5 
System failure modes*: (3) and (4) 
 * See Section 3.4.3. 
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Figure 3.15 Bounds by B3 method and conventional approach (Case II) 
 
Figures 3.15-3.17 show the bounds and critical failure sequences for Case II. As shown in 
Figure 3.15, the lower and upper bounds by the B3 method at 5% gap termination point are 
estimated as 2.302×10−3 and 2.416×10−3 respectively with only 27 structural analyses of the truss. 
The system failure probability is estimated as 2.392×10−3 by Monte Carlo simulation (one 
million samples, c.o.v. 2.04×10−2), which belongs to the interval by the B3 analysis, and is fairly 
close to the upper bound as observed in the previous examples. The aforementioned limitations 
of the conventional approach are more clearly seen in this example. There is a long flat trend of 
the lower bound (between 10 and 43 structural analyses), which may lead to early termination of 
the search. By contrast, in the B3 approach, the existence of the upper bound and the continuous 
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increase in the lower bound help avoid the risk of inaccurate estimation of the system failure 
probability. 
 
 
Figure 3.16 Critical system failure sequences identified until 5% termination point (Case II) 
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Figure 3.17 Four major system failure sequences (Case II) 
 
Figure 3.16 shows the probabilities of the critical failure sequences identified until the 5% 
termination point of the B3 analysis, and Figure 3.17 displays the four major system failure 
sequences along with their probabilities. It is also noted that the different assumptions on the 
1st collapse mode 
Probability from B3 method: 9.08×10−4 
Probability from simulation:  9.34×10−4 
System failure criterion: (3) and (4) 
2nd collapse mode 
Probability from B3 method: 9.08×10−4 
Probability from simulation:  8.57×10−4 
System failure criterion: (4) 
3rd collapse mode 
Probability from B3 method: 1.24×10−4 
Probability from simulation:  1.16×10−4 
System failure criterion: (4) 
4th collapse mode 
Probability from B3 method: 1.51×10−4 
Probability from simulation:  1.65×10−4 
System failure criterion: (3) and (4) 
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uncertainties by Cases I and II lead to different orderings in the identified system failure 
sequences. 
3.5. Summary 
A new Branch-and-Bound method employing system reliability Bounds (termed the B3 method) 
was developed in order to estimate the probability of system failure caused by fatigue-induced 
sequential failures by identifying critical system failure sequences efficiently and accurately. Due 
to the proposed disjoint cut-set formulation employing a recursive formulation of limit-states and 
systematic search procedure, the B3 method can identify critical sequences of fatigue-induced 
failures causing a system failure in the decreasing order of their likelihood. Unlike existing 
branch-and-bound approaches, the proposed method provides both lower and upper bounds on 
the system failure probability while the size of the updates on each bound is diminishing 
monotonically. Every structural analysis performed during the search contributes to updating 
either lower or upper bound, i.e. narrowing the bounds. This significantly reduces the 
computational time required for accurate results especially when computational cost for 
structural analyses is dominant. The updated bounds provide reasonable criteria for terminating a 
branch-and-bound search without missing critical sequences. After a demonstration by a multi-
layer Daniels system, the method was tested by a three-dimensional offshore structure with 66 
members. The results by the B3 method are verified by crude Monte Carlo simulations. The 
merits of the proposed approach are successfully demonstrated through comparison with the 
results by a conventional branch-and-bound approach. 
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4. FE-BASED SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF FATIGUE-INDUCED 
SEQUENTIAL FAILURES OF CONTINUUM STRUCTURES 
 
In Chapter 3, the B3 method was developed for system reliability analysis of fatigue-induced 
sequential failure. The method quantifies the risk of fatigue-induced sequential failure at the 
system level and identifies critical failure sequences in the decreasing order of likelihood. The B3 
method was originally developed for reliability analysis of discrete structures such as truss. 
Therefore, the method is not readily applicable to continuum structures, which are often 
represented by finite element (FE) models. In particular, the method has limitations in describing 
general stress distributions in limit-state formulations, evaluating stress intensity range based on 
crack length, and dealing with slow convergence of the upper and lower bounds for structures 
with high redundancy. In this chapter, the B3 method (in Chapter 3) is integrated with the FE-
SRA framework (in Chapter 2) and further developed to perform FE-based system reliability 
analysis of fatigue-induced sequential failures of continuum structures. 
4.1. Literature Review 
As discussed in Chapter 3, fatigue is one of the main causes of failures in various structural 
systems. Therefore, an adequate level of structural redundancy should be provided to prevent 
fatigue-induced structural failure, and some studies have been undertaken to quantify the 
likelihood of system-level failure caused by fatigue-induced sequential failures, especially for 
offshore structures, which are often modeled as discrete (truss) structures (Almar-Naess 1985, 
Moan 2005, Karamchandani 1992, Moan and Song 2000, Shabakhty et al. 2003). However, it is 
noted that fatigue-induced sequential failure is an important failure mechanism not only to 
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discrete structures, but also to continuum structures such as subsystems in aircraft structures. For 
example, according to the “Damage Tolerance” design philosophy adopted by the U.S. Air Force 
in early 1970s, an aircraft structure with some cracks is still considered safe as long as the 
structure can resist further damage and system failure, and can accomplish the mission for a 
given period of time (Tiffany 1978, Millwater and Wieland 2010). Therefore, for risk-based 
design, maintenance, and retrofit of robust structural systems from truss to continuum, it is 
essential to quantify the likelihood of fatigue-induced sequential failures and identify the critical 
sequences of local failures. 
However, it is noted that most of the existing studies about the reliability analysis of 
fatigue-induced sequential failure (reviewed in Section 3.1) focus on relatively simple discrete 
structures such as truss. There have been few studies on such reliability analysis of more 
complex structures (such as continuum), and the applications using sophisticated FE simulations 
are limited (Alford et al. 1992, Shi and Mahadevan 2001). Even though the aforementioned 
merits of the B3 method have been successfully demonstrated through numerical examples in 
Chapter 3, the method was originally developed for system reliability analysis of truss-type 
structures, and thus not readily applicable to continuum structures due to the following 
limitations as discussed in Lee and Song (2011b): (1) the far-field stress, which is a main 
parameter in the fatigue crack-growth formulation of the B3 method, is not generally conspicuous 
for a continuum structure; (2) it is not always feasible to derive an analytical relationship 
between the stress intensity range and the crack length using the so-called geometry function for 
a continuum which has a complex stress distribution; and (3) the structural complexity of a 
continuum often results in many dominant failure sequences having a similar level of likelihood, 
which prevents fast convergence of the lower and upper bounds during a B3 analysis. 
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In order to take advantage of the merits of the B3 method for FE-based system reliability 
analysis of continuum structures, the method is further developed as follows (Lee and Song 
2011b): (1) the limit-state function formulation is modified to incorporate the general stress 
distribution instead of using a far-field stress assumption; (2) an external computer program is 
integrated with the B3 computational framework to estimate the stress intensity range with the 
general stress distribution without relying on analytical geometry function Y(a); and (3) an 
additional search termination criterion is introduced to facilitate efficient system reliability 
analysis of a continuum that has many failure sequences with similar probabilities. Hereafter, the 
B3 method further developed in this chapter for continuum structures is referred to as the B3 
method for continuum, while the method described in Chapter 3 is called the B3 method for truss. 
4.2. Branch-and-Bound Method Employing System Reliability Bounds for Continuum  
(B3 Method for Continuum) 
4.2.1. Development I: limit-state function formulations for general stress distribution 
The limit-state function formulation of the B3 method for continuum also starts with Paris 
equation in Eq. (3.1), to characterize the speed of the crack growth. In the B3 method for truss, 
the stress intensity range (∆K) was evaluated by use of Newman’s approximation, i.e. by using 
an analytical function of far-field stress and crack length, as shown in Eq. (3.2). In order to 
incorporate general stress distribution rather than analytical functions based on Newman’s 
approximation, the limit-state function formulations have been modified as follows. Integrating 
Eq. (3.1) from the initial condition to the current time point, the relation between the time 
duration T and the corresponding crack length a is derived as 
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  0 0
1a
m
a
da C N C T
K
       (4.1)
At the i-th member, a crack failure is assumed to occur when the crack exceeds a critical length 
aic. Then, the limit-state function for the member’s failure within an inspection cycle [0, Ts] is 
described as 
 0
0
0
1 1( )
c
i
i
a
i i s m s
a
g T T da T
C K
     X   (4.2)
The difference between this and the limit-state function in Eq. (3.6) is that the stress intensity 
factor 　K is not evaluated by Newman’s approximation. Similarly to Eq. (3.11), an auxiliary 
“damage” function is then determined as 
 0
1( )
a
m
a
a da
K
     (4.3)
Consider the failure sequence {12} for example, using the damage function, one can derive the 
followings: 
1 0 0
2 2 0 1( ) ( )a a C T      (4.4a)
1 1
2 2 0 2( ) ( )
ca a C T     (4.4b)
Summing up Eqs. (4.4a) and (4.4b), one obtains 
0 1 0
2 2 0 2 0 1( ) ( )
ca a C T C T        (4.5)
Solving Eq. (4.5) for T21, one can derive 
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where ΔK20 and ΔK21 respectively denote the range of the stress intensity factors at member 2 in 
the intact structure and in the damaged structure with the first failure at member 1. The time until 
the failure, i.e. Ti0 in Eq. (4.2) can be described in terms of the crack length at a different member. 
For example, the time until the failure in member 1 is 
1
1 2
0 0
1 2
0
1 0 0
0 01 2
1 1 1 1
ca a
m m
a a
T da da
C CK K
             (4.7)
Substituting Eq. (4.7) into Eq. (4.6), one can derive 
2
1
2
1
2 1
0 2
1 1
ca
m
a
T da
C K
        (4.8)
Considering Eq. (4.4a), Eq. (4.8) is further derived as follows to describe T21 in terms of the 
previous time term in the sequence, T10: 
89 
 
1
2 2
0 0
2 2
1
2
2 0
2
1
2
0
2
0
2
1
2 1 1
0 02 2
1
20
11
0 2
0
2
1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1
c
c
a a
m m
a a
a
ma
a
m a
a
m
a
T da da
C CK K
da
K
da T
C K da
K
        
       
  
 



 



  (4.9)
In the case of a truss structure, ΔK can be estimated by use of Newman’s approximation in Eq. 
(3.2), and the ratio of two integrals in Eq. (4.9) is simply (S20/S21)m where S20 and S21 are the far-
field stresses at member 2 in the intact structure and in the structure with member 1 damaged, 
respectively. It is important to note that in such a case, T21 can be calculated without estimating 
a21. However, Newman’s approximation employing far-field stress is not generally available. In 
such a general case, a21 is needed to use Eq. (4.9). One could try to solve Eq. (4.7) for a21 each 
time, but it would seriously harm the efficiency of the analysis which requires solving the 
equation a large number of times. 
For this reason, in the B3 method for continuum, Eq. (4.9) is approximated by performing 
both integrals in the ratio up to a2c instead of a21, i.e. 
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  (4.10)
Through mathematical induction, the following recursive formulation is derived for a general 
failure sequence {12…(i–1)}: 
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The impact of the approximation in computing the ratio is examined by a numerical example in 
Chapter 3. The B3 method for truss (i.e. the B3 method that does not employ this approximation) 
is also applicable to the example, which enables us to assess the impact of the approximation 
accurately. 
4.2.2. Development II: evaluating stress intensity range using an external computer program 
The generalized formulation of time terms in Eq. (4.11) makes it essential to compute the range 
of the stress intensity factor (ΔK) along the crack length (a) for a complex stress distribution 
which cannot be generally described by a far-field stress. Among a variety of existing computer 
programs and methods for crack-growth analysis, AFGROW® (Harter 2006) is chosen for 
finding the a-ΔK relation without relying on Newman’s approximation.  
AFGROW® provides a variety of crack-growth models which allow users to predict 
crack growth for various geometries, materials, and stress distributions. AFGROW® provides 
not only closed-form stress intensity solutions for simple cases, but also non-closed-form 
solutions for general cases based on the results of the FE analysis. Another advantage of 
AFGROW® is that the software provides Component Object Model (COM) Automation 
interface, which allows other Windows applications such as MS Excel® to communicate with 
AFGROW®. This feature is particularly useful because the proposed system reliability analysis 
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method of fatigue-induced sequential failures requires a large number of deterministic crack-
growth analyses.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Computational framework of the B3 method for continuum 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the computational framework of the B3 method for FE system 
reliability analysis of a continuum. The main B3 analysis code in MATLAB® repeatedly calls 
ABAQUS® to obtain the stress distribution from the finite element (FE) analysis for given 
Random Variables (RVs) and damage conditions during the search procedure, and the stress 
distribution is transferred to AFGROW® for estimating the corresponding stress intensity range 
along the crack length, which is the basic information needed for estimating the time term in Eq. 
(4.11). The computational framework in Figure 4.1 performs successfully in the numerical 
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examples in this chapter. However, AFGROW® and ABAQUS® can be replaced by other 
computer programs for crack-growth and FE analysis if necessary. 
4.2.3. Development III: additional termination criterion for systematic search scheme 
The flow chart in Figure 4.2 illustrates the search procedure of the B3 method for continuum. 
After performing the first FE analysis and crack-growth analysis respectively using ABAQUS ® 
and AFGROW®, the first set of child nodes are branched out from the initial node and their 
probabilities are calculated through component and system reliability analyses. For the numerical 
examples in this thesis, the First-Order Reliability Method (FORM) and the Second-order 
Reliability Method (SORM) are used for component reliability analysis (Der Kiureghian 2005). 
A multivariate normal integral method by Genz (1992) is used for system reliability analysis. 
Based on the probability calculations, the first bounding is made and Pupp is decreased by the 
probability of the newly-identified non-failure case. The next step is to compare all the nodes 
except for system-failure, non-failure, and “parent” nodes to select the one with the highest 
probability. Then, a new FE analysis is performed using an FE model representing the damage 
scenario of the selected node. If the FE analysis reveals that the selected node represents a 
system failure case, Plow is increased by the probability of the node. On the other hand, if the FE 
analysis reveals that a system-level failure does not occur, another crack-growth analysis and 
branching process are performed to find the probabilities of child nodes originating from the 
selected node. 
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Figure 4.2 Flow chart of the B3 method for continuum 
 
This search process repeating “branching” and “bounding” is continued until the 
termination criteria are satisfied. If finding the most critical paths is the main interest, one can 
terminate the search process when the most recently identified system failure sequence has a 
probability lower than a given threshold or a desirable number of critical failure sequences is 
identified. On the other hand, if estimating the system failure probability is of interest, one could 
terminate the process when the updates on the bounds made by the newly-identified failure 
FE simulation of intact structure 
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* : Check the termination criteria 
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sequence become negligible compared to the overall risk level identified by the bounds. When 
the system failure probability of a three-dimensional truss structure was calculated in Chapter 3, 
the search was terminated when the ratio of the gap of the bounds to the upper bound becomes 
smaller than a given threshold value. However, more complex structures with a higher level of 
structural redundancy including continuum structures tend to have many competing failure 
sequences with similar likelihood. In this case, the termination rule based on the gap of the 
bounds may result in spending large computational time in identifying many competing failure 
sequences with negligible probabilities and making very small updates on the lower bound. In 
order to avoid making unnecessary computational efforts on negligible updates on the lower 
bound, in the B3 method for continuum, it is suggested to terminate if the updates on the lower 
bound become negligible. In summary, the search process is terminated if any of the following 
conditions is satisfied: 
1) (the gap of two bounds ) / (the upper bound)  < ε1 
2) (the lower bound increment) / (the upper bound)  < ε2 
where ε1 and ε2 are predetermined values that are fairly small compared to 1.0, which define the 
convergence level of a particular analysis. For the numerical examples in this chapter, ε1=0.05 
and ε2=0.001 are used. The performance of the newly-suggested termination criteria will be 
tested and compared to that of the criteria proposed in the B3 method for truss (in Chapter 3). 
4.3. Numerical Example I: FE Multi-layer Daniels System 
In this section, the multi-layer Daniels system which was introduced in Chapter 3 is considered 
again as a numerical verification example of the B3 method for continuum. This is because 1) the 
structure is simple and widely used as a numerical example to test a new system reliability 
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analysis method (as discussed in Section 3.3); and 2) since the system consists of discrete 
members (bars) and far-field stress is available, the B3 method for truss is also applicable to this 
example, which enables us to investigate the impact of the approximation of the limit-state 
function formulation in Eq. (4.11). 
4.3.1. Problem description 
The structural behavior is the same as the one in Chapter 3, and the component and system 
failure definitions are also identical with Chapter 3. As shown in Figure 4.3 (left), the multi-layer 
Daniels system consists of six bars that are assumed to be perfectly brittle and to have identical 
and deterministic elastic moduli. The cross sectional areas of the bars are given as A1=100mm2, 
A2=A3=50mm2, and A4=A5=A6=33.33mm2, and their widths are W1=38.1mm, W2=W3=19.05mm, 
and W4=W5=W6=12.7mm. In this example, the uncertainties of initial crack length 0ia , external 
load I, and C and m in Paris equation are considered as random variables with the mean values 
0.11 (mm), 17.2 (kN), 1.36×10−13 (mm/cycle/(MPa·mm)m), and 3.0, respectively. It is assumed 
that the initial crack length follows exponential distribution and the other random variables 
follow lognormal distribution. The coefficients of variation (c.o.v.) of ai0, I, C, and m are 1.0, 0.1, 
0.533, and 0.02, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, all random variables are assumed to be 
statistically independent of each other. In addition, the following deterministic parameters are 
used: the loading frequency (ν0): 100 (cycle/hour), the inspection cycle (Ts): 2,000 hours, and the 
critical crack lengths: a1c=30.48mm, a2c= a3c=15.24mm, and a4c= a5c= a6c=10.16mm.  
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Figure 4.3 Multi-layer Daniels system (left); and its FE model in ABAQUS® (right) 
 
Compared to the example in Chapter 3, some deterministic and random parameters are 
changed. Although most of the changes are not significant for the system reliability analysis of 
the structure, it is noticeable that the constant geometric function (i.e. Y(a)=3 in Section 3.3.1) is 
not employed to make the example more realistic. The specific geometric function will be 
provided in the following section. 
Based on the above conditions, a finite element (FE) model is constructed for 
ABAQUS® as shown in Figure 4.3 (right). Figure 4.4 shows the FE responses of the intact 
structure and the damaged structure with member 2’s failure (circle) for example. As stated in 
Section 3.2, the stress distribution estimated by the FE analysis is transferred to AFGROW®, 
and the corresponding a-ΔK relation is returned for calculating the time terms in Eq. (4.11). 
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Figure 4.4 The stress distribution of the intact structure (left); and the damaged structure after 
the failure of the member 2 (right) 
 
4.3.2. Analysis results 
Figure 4.5 shows the updates of the upper and lower bounds of system failure probability with 
the number of “FE simulations” during the analysis employing the B3 method for continuum. It 
is noteworthy from Figure 4.2 that each of FE simulations leads to either a branching or a system 
failure case identification, which decreases the upper bound or increases the lower bound, 
respectively. When the analysis is terminated, the upper and lower bounds are estimated as 
1.010×10−2 and 9.608×10−3 for 30 FE simulations. 
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Figure 4.5 Bounds on the system failure probability by the B3 method for continuum 
 
Since the load is assumed to be equally distributed to the remaining bars on each story, 
the far-field stress in each bar is easily calculated by dividing the external load by the sum of the 
cross sectional areas of the remaining bars in this example. Therefore, this problem can be also 
solved by the B3 method for truss (i.e. the B3 method in Chapter 3 before further developments 
described in this chapter) as well. Based on the far-field stress, we are able to estimate ΔK by use 
of Newman’s approximation in Eq. (3.2) and the following geometry function (Harter 2006, 
Tada et al. 1985): 
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  (4.12)
where Y(a) is the geometry function, a is the crack length, and W is the width of a plate. 
By the B3 method for truss, the bounds are estimated as 9.767×10−3 and 9.299×10−3 after 
32 structural analyses. From Monte Carlo simulations (MCS) with 3×105 sets of generated 
random variables, the system failure probability is estimated as 9.807×10−3 (c.o.v.=1.83%), 
which requires 3.163×105 structural analyses. In addition, the B3-based methods and MCS can 
also identify the critical failure sequences in the decreasing order of their probabilities. For the 
nine most critical failure sequences, which can be categorized into three failure patterns, all three 
methods provide the exact same order of patterns as shown in Table 1. Due to the symmetry, the 
second and third failure patterns respectively have two and six failure sequences with the same 
likelihoods. It is noted that MCS does not provide us with such symmetric results due to its 
random-sampling nature. All the results from three different approaches match well, and the 
slight difference between the results from the B3 method for truss and the B3 method for 
continuum is mainly due to the approximation introduced in Eq. (4.11). 
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Identified 
failure sequence
Probability by  
the B3 method for 
truss (×10−3) 
Probability by  
the B3 method for 
continuum (×10−3) 
Probability by  
Monte Carlo 
simulation (×10−3) 
1 4.871 4.869 4.660 
2 → 3 1.332 1.408 1.263 
3 → 2 1.332 1.408 1.353 
4 → 5 → 6 0.294 0.321 0.320 
4 → 6 → 5 0.294 0.321 0.307 
5 → 4 → 6 0.294 0.321 0.335 
5 → 6 → 4 0.294 0.321 0.363 
6 → 4 → 5 0.294 0.321 0.341 
6 → 5 → 4 0.294 0.321 0.322 
 
Table 4.1 Identified critical failure sequences in the continuum Daniels system 
 
Lastly, in Figure 4.5, it is noted that the upper bound curve becomes almost flat relatively 
early in the search, at a level fairly close to the actual system risk confirmed by MCS. This is 
because, as the search proceeds, FE analyses are performed for systems with more damage and 
less redundancy. Most of the updates are thus made on the lower bound. Therefore, in most cases, 
it is not necessary to wait until the bounds converge to each other too closely, which is the 
motivation for introducing an additional termination criterion on the lower bound in Section 
4.2.3. 
4.4. Numerical Example II: Longeron in Aircraft Structure 
In order to test the applicability of the proposed method to continuum structures, an aircraft 
longeron system is considered, which is a non-discrete structural system with a higher level of 
structural complexity compared to truss-type structures. A longeron is a thin strip of metal, wood, 
or carbon fiber, to which the skin of the aircraft is fastened, and has been widely used as a target 
structure of verification examples (Heida and Grooteman 1998, Gooteman 2008, Taylor 1998) 
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due to the following advantages: (1) Despite their structural complexity, it is easy to identify “hot 
spots” which have relatively high stresses and are generally located around fasteners; (2) Local 
failure of a fastener can be described as the event that its crack length exceeds a critical level; 
and (3) It is relatively simple to reflect the damage or failure of the identified member in the FE 
model. 
4.4.1. Structural configuration and loading 
Figure 4.6 shows an FE model of longeron system developed in ABAQUS® and the numbering 
choices of 40 fastener holes, which are considered as possible locations of crack failures. A big 
plate on the bottom is a part of the aircraft skin, and the assembled structure on the skin 
represents the longeron. Figure 4.7 displays how parts in the longeron are assembled. Two long 
T-shaped parts are overlapped in the middle, and then fastened with two small plates. It is 
assumed that the main material of the skin and longeron is aluminum. All the parts are attached 
together by 6.35mm (0.25-inch) diameter fasteners made of steel, i.e. D=6.35mm. The fasteners 
are simulated by spring elements. Around the fasteners, the edge of each part has 3×D distance 
from the center of the first fastener, and the pitch between fasteners has a 6×D distance. 
Assuming the longeron system is located in an upper fuselage under bending caused by vertical 
acceleration, the system is subjected to pure tension/compression loads, which cause an initial 
crack of around each fastener hole to grow from hole to the nearest edge. Figure 4.8 shows the 
load re-distribution caused by a local crack failure (circle). 
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Figure 4.6 Longeron FE model and fastener hole numbers 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Assembly of longeron FE model 
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Figure 4.8 Load re-distribution after a local failure by an FE simulation 
 
The loading intensity, the loading frequency (ν0), the inspection cycle (Ts), and the 
critical crack lengths are given as 206.8 Mpa, 15/hour, 2,000 hours, and 12.7mm, respectively. 
These parameters are assumed to be deterministic. The uncertainty in the loading amplitude is 
described by a random load-scale factor I as explained in the following section. 
4.4.2. Statistical parameters 
The statistical properties of the random variables are summarized in Table 4.2. The values of the 
statistical parameters in the table were determined based on a comprehensive literature survey 
performed in Chapter 3. In this example, one random variable I is used to describe the 
uncertainty in the loading intensity (i.e. the loading intensity 206.8 Mpa is scaled by this random 
variable), and each of 40 fastener holes has one random variable of a0. In addition, based on 
findings from preliminary deterministic FE analysis, hot spots are identified around all fastener 
holes on the two T-shaped parts. For that reason, two random variables are assigned to represent 
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C and m of each of the two parts. Therefore, a total of 45 random variables are used. All random 
variables are assumed to be statistically independent of each other except the following cases for 
which non-zero correlation coefficients are assigned: (1) between Paris equation parameters (C) 
of two different parts (correlation coefficient: 0.6); (2) between Paris equation parameters (m) of 
two different parts (correlation: 0.6); (3) between initial crack lengths (a0) of two different 
fastener holes (correlation: 0.6); (4) between C and m of the same parts (correlation: −0.97); and 
(5) between C and m of two different parts (correlation: −0.6). 
 
Random variables Mean c.o.v. Distribution type 
Number of 
random variables 
C  1.202×10−13 0.533 Lognormal 2 
m 3.0 0.02 Lognormal 2 
a0 (mm) 0.11 1.0 Exponential 40 
I 1.0 0.1 Lognormal 1 
 
Table 4.2 Statistical properties of random variables 
 
The correlation coefficients in cases (1), (2), (3), and (5) can be changed depending on 
how closely the manufacture processes of two different parts are related to each other. However, 
it is noted the strong negative correlation between C and m in case (4) has been presented in 
several studies reported in the literature (Yarema 1980, Borrego et al. 2001). 
4.4.3. Component and system failure definitions 
In this example, it is assumed that the section around a fastener hole fails when its crack length 
reaches the 80% of the distance between the fastener hole and the edge; however, one can use 
another component failure definition of interest. Upon the occurrence of such a section failure, 
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the corresponding crack is embodied in the FE model, which causes stress re-distribution as 
shown in Figure 4.8 (right).  
As an attempt to accurately identify system failure cases via FE analyses instead of 
introducing heuristic system failure criteria, in this example, it is assumed that the structural 
system fails if net-section yielding occurs around any hole in the system (i.e. the average stress 
of the area excluding a hole and a crack reaches the yielding stress limit). The yield strengths of 
aluminum and steel are given as 496.4 and 517.1 MPa, respectively. It should be noted that this 
is an example of system failure criteria that can be used during a B3 search. Like the component 
failure criteria, one can introduce a set of his/her own system failure criteria (e.g., the occurrence 
of a local yielding and the observation of a large displacement) based on the objectives and 
safety concerns of a target structure. 
4.4.4. Analysis results 
Figure 4.9 shows the updates of the upper and lower bounds made by the B3 method for 
continuum. With the new termination criteria described in Section 3.3, the lower and upper 
bounds are respectively 1.192×10-3 and 1.321×10-3 after only 156 FE simulations. With the old 
criteria (i.e. the first one only), however, both bounds are respectively 1.209×10-3 and 1.273×10-3 
for 406 FE simulations. In the previous multi-layer Daniels system and the numerical examples 
in Lee and Song (2011a), it was noted that the actual system risk was closer to the upper bound 
rather than the lower bound. Without no significant update in the upper bound, the old 
termination criteria requires 7 more days to perform 250 more FE simulations using a general 
personal computer (2.61 GHz CPU and 3.25 GB RAM). These additional costs are consumed 
mostly for identifying many negligible failure sequences and making slight updates on the lower 
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bound. This is because the longeron system has many failure sequences which have a similar 
level of likelihood. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Bounds by the B3 method with old and new termination criteria 
 
In addition, the critical failure sequences are identified in the decreasing order of their 
likelihood. The eight most critical failure sequences, which can be grouped into four major 
patterns, are listed in Table 4.3. As shown in the table, we can observe various system failure 
sequences on different locations and materials. It is noteworthy that the results of the B3 analysis 
reflect the symmetry of the longeron, which can be easily confirmed from Figure 4.6. 
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Identified 
failure sequence
Probability by  
the B3 method (×10−3) Yielding material Yielding location 
11 4.448 aluminum around #11 hole 
28 4.448 aluminum around #28 hole 
22 → 5 0.480 steel #35 fastener 
5 → 22 0.480 steel #35 fastener 
23 → 11 0.282 aluminum around #11 hole 
6 → 28 0.282 aluminum around #28 hole 
6 → 22 → 4 0.109 steel #35 fastener 
23 → 5 → 21 0.109 steel #35 fastener 
 
Table 4.3 Identified critical system failure sequences in the aircraft longeron structure 
 
Lastly, it should be also noted that the B3 method for truss is not applicable to this 
continuum problem, and MCS would not be a feasible option due to the computational cost. The 
minimum number of samples (Nδ) to achieve a target level of c.o.v.(δ) can be calculated by Nδ = 
(1-Pf)/(δ2Pf) where Pf is the probability of the event of interest (Haldar and Mahadevan 2000). 
For 5% c.o.v., therefore, it would be required to explore 3×105 samples with a similar number of 
FE simulations. However, it is impossible to perform such a huge number of FE analyses even 
though each analysis takes only a few minutes. Furthermore, the computational cost will 
significantly increase if a lower level of probability is expected or one aims to achieve a high-
level of convergence (i.e. low c.o.v. value). On the other hand, the proposed method allows us to 
perform system reliability analysis for only 156 FE simulations. 
4.5. Summary 
In this chapter, the Branch-and-Bound (B&B) method employing system reliability Bounds 
(proposed in Chapter 3) is further developed for FE-based system reliability analysis of fatigue-
induced sequential failures of continuum structures. Despite merits over existing branch-and-
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bound approaches, the B3 method which was originally developed for truss is not readily 
applicable to continuum structures because of its limitations in (1) describing general stress 
distributions in limit-state formulations; (2) evaluating stress intensity range based on the crack 
length; and (3) dealing with slow convergence of the bounds for continuum. In order to 
overcome these limitations, (1) the limit-state function was modified to incorporate general stress 
distribution instead of using far-field stress assumption; (2) an external computer program such 
as AFGROW® was incorporated into the B3 computational framework to estimate the stress 
intensity range for the given stress distribution; and (3) the termination criteria of B3 analysis 
was modified to avoid performing unnecessary simulations that would make insignificant 
updates on the lower bound. The B3 method for continuum was demonstrated by a numerical 
example of multi-layer Daniels system, and the results were verified by the B3 method for truss 
and Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, the proposed method was applied to a numerical 
example of aircraft longeron system. It was successfully shown that the proposed method enable 
us to perform system reliability analysis of fatigue-induced sequential failures using a large-scale 
FE models. 
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5. INSPECTION-BASED SYSTEM RELIABILITY UPDATING FOR FATIGUE-
INDUCED SEQUENTIAL FAILURE 
 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, fatigue-induced sequential failure is one of the major failure 
modes of a structural system, and an adequate level of structural redundancy should be provided 
to avoid the disastrous collapse of the structural system. Such structural safety can be guaranteed 
through not only proper structural design, but also structural maintenance such as inspection. For 
efficient risk-based maintenance, it is thus essential to estimate the reliability of a structure 
against fatigue-induced sequential failures and update the original reliability based on the 
observations from inspections. The development of the B3 method enables us to perform system 
reliability analysis of fatigue-induced sequential failures of discrete structures (Chapter 3) and 
continuum structures (Chapter 4). This chapter introduces a new system reliability updating 
method employing the B3 method. The new method allows us to update the original system-level 
reliability of a structure based on inspection results in an accurate and efficient way. 
5.1. Literature Review 
Much research effort has been dedicated to the inspection-based reliability updating of structures, 
and several approaches have been developed as a result. These approaches are categorized as 
“parameter updating” (or “model updating”) and “reliability updating” (Moan and Song 2000). 
In parameter updating, the distribution parameters of random variables (such as mean and 
standard deviation) are updated using the inspection results to reduce statistical uncertainties in 
the random variables by the additional information from the inspection. Updating statistical 
parameters naturally leads to updated reliability estimates of the structure. There has been 
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increasing interest in solving this challenging problem, especially by the use of a Bayesian 
approach (Box and Tiao 1992, Sivia 1996), and a comprehensive review of parameter updating 
(model updating) can be found in Beck and Au (2002). By contrast, in reliability updating, the 
new information obtained from inspections is used directly to update the original reliability 
which was calculated during the design process to the conditional probability given inspection 
results. In either approach, if the updated reliability reveals that the structure does not have an 
adequate level of safety, additional structural members or repair efforts can be introduced. 
The choice of an updating approach depends mainly on the nature of additional 
information available from inspections and the structural details. If the original statistical data of 
the random variables are not reliable and need to be more robust, they can be updated through 
inspection and the reliability can be further updated using the updated statistical parameters. The 
original reliability can be updated directly if the statistical parameters are reliable. In this thesis, 
the focus will be on reliability updating. 
There have been many studies about inspection-based reliability updating. Many of the 
previous studies focused on updating the original reliability of the structural members (Madsen 
1985, Jiao and Moan 1990, Zhao et al. 1994). In these studies, the sources of uncertainty in 
structural inspections were defined and the types of inspection event were classified. However, 
both initial reliability analysis and updating were limited to component events. In a variety of 
structures, however, the system aspects need to be considered for accurate risk estimation and 
inspection-based reliability updating (Moan and Song 2000). In particular, the structural 
reliability against fatigue-induced sequential failures needs to be analyzed at the system level as 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, and it is the same with inspection-based reliability updating. 
However, system reliability updating is a challenging task because the common or correlated 
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random variables involved with fatigue crack growth may result in significant statistical 
dependence among the failures of different structural members or among inspected and 
uninspected members. Furthermore, due to the nature of fatigue-induced sequential failure, each 
structural member generally contributes to multiple important failure sequences. 
It is noted that simulation techniques have been employed in some previous studies. 
Because there is a challenge in treating “reliability updating” using simulation techniques, most 
of the studies employing simulation techniques dealt with “parameter updating.” In order to 
overcome the challenge, Straub (2011) developed a method to make various reliability analysis 
methods including simulation techniques applicable to reliability updating. (The challenge and 
the method proposed by Straub (2011) will be discussed in more details, in Section 4.1.2.) In 
addition, Beck and Au (2002) also employed a simulation approach to obtain updated reliability 
estimates of a structure. These simulation-based-approaches are straightforward and help account 
for system effects in structural behavior and inspections. However, due to the nature of 
simulation-based techniques, they may require exceedingly large cost for converged results, 
especially when the level of the updated probability is low. 
The existing simulation- and non-simulation-based studies on reliability updating have a 
couple of important points in common. First, the original probability can be updated whether an 
inspection detects a crack or not, which allows for the full usage of the inspection results during 
the update. Second, reliability updating is affected by uncertainty in detection, which is often 
characterized by the probability of detection (POD). In reality, a crack may not be detected due 
to an error by the detection device. Of course, POD increases if a crack-detection device with a 
high resolution is used. Much effort has been devoted in various industries to evaluate the quality 
of non-destructive techniques (NDT) for inspection for cracks in metals, and the likelihood that a 
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crack is detected is expressed by a POD curve for the NDT used for inspection. A detailed 
literature review of POD can be found in Moan and Ayala-Uraga (2008). 
Since these studies on reliability updating methodologies, several further studies have 
been conducted on optimal inspection strategies. In general, strategies are categorized as risk 
based inspection (RBI) or cost based inspection (Soares 2000). According to Straub (2004), the 
research about RBI began in the early 1970’s, and quantitative inspection models were first 
investigated to update deterioration models using Bayes’ rule (Tang 1973). Yang and Trapp 
(1974) presented a sophisticated procedure that allowed for the computation of the probability of 
fatigue failure for aircraft under periodic inspections, taking into account the uncertainty in the 
inspection performance. Based on this procedure, Yang and Trapp (1975) introduced a method 
for optimizing inspection frequencies. A more detailed literature review can be found in Straub 
(2004). 
On the other hand, Toyoda-Makino and Tanaka (1998) proposed a cost-based optimal 
inspection strategy for random fatigue crack growth. Their results showed that using reliability as 
the only criterion was contrary to engineering reality, since structural system availability is being 
degraded while inspection cost is increasing. It is also considered that periodical inspections are 
not always effective for fatigue failure because the fatigue crack growth rate gradually 
accelerates as the fatigue damage grows. For these reasons, the authors proposed an optimal 
inspection schedule minimizing cost for fatigue failure. There have been several other studies 
about cost-based inspection planning, and a detailed review is presented in Soares (2000). 
Another noticeable point of previous studies about inspection-based reliability updating is 
the types of structure that have been considered. The most common are offshore structures 
because, in reality, the offshore industry often requires that the structural integrity of fixed 
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offshore platforms be ensured by periodic inspection. For this reason, several authors have dealt 
with offshore structures in their research, e.g., Wirching et al. (1990), Baker and Descamps 
(1999), and Jiao and Moan (1990). The authors first derived formulations describing fatigue-
induced failure to perform an initial fatigue reliability analysis and then discussed optimal 
inspection planning and maintenance strategies. In their formulations, however, the stress of 
structural members was mostly assumed to have uniform distribution because offshore platforms 
can be considered as truss. The approaches based on this assumption cannot deal with continuum 
structures that usually show non-uniform stress distribution. Although there have been several 
studies for other types of structures, such as aircraft structures by Yang and Trapp (1974), Itagaki 
and Ito (1998), and Deodatis et al. (1992), and bridges by Zhao et al. (1994), the formulations 
were all based on uniformly-distributed stress. 
In spite of the aforementioned research efforts about reliability updating and further 
applications, there have been few studies about fatigue-induced sequential failure. In addition, 
most of the existing studies focus on marine structures (Moan and Song 2000, Moan and Ayala-
Uraga 2008) and bridges (Zhao et al. 1994, Zhu and Wu 2011) modeled by discrete structural 
models, and there is a lack of research for other structural types such as continuum. These 
motivated the development of a new system reliability updating method for fatigue-induced 
sequential failure over truss and continuum. This chapter proposes a new system reliability 
updating method employing the B3 method.  
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5.2. Reliability Updating through Inspection Events 
In many previous studies about inspection-based reliability updating, researchers have 
constructed the basic formulations starting from conditional probability. First, let us describe the 
probability of an event as 
 i iP P E   (5.1)
where Ei stands for a general event of interest at the i-th structural member. Although a 
component event is introduced in Eq. (5.1) and used in the following derivation, it can be 
replaced by a system event if one aims to update the system reliability. The probability Pi in Eq. 
(5.1) is updated to the following conditional probability based on an inspection result at the j-th 
member: 
 , |i up i jP P E IE   (5.2)
where IEj stands for an inspection event at the j-th member. Reliability updating can be made 
whether the member of interest was actually inspected (i.e. i = j) or not (i.e. i ≠ j). 
Eq. (5.2) can be extended to utilize multiple available inspection results for reliability 
updating. The updated probability at the i-th member is 
, |i up i j k lP P E IE IE IE         (5.3)
where IEj, IEk, …, IEl denote the inspection events observed at multiple structural members. The 
impact of using several inspection events to reliability updating will be discussed in the 
following numerical examples. 
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Inspection results are normally categorized into two types of events: “equality” and 
“inequality” types, depending on whether a crack is detected or not. Since inspections are 
generally made at multiple locations, there are three possible combinations of the inspection 
results, inequality, equality, and mixed cases (Jiao and Moan 1990), as explained in detail below. 
5.2.1. Inequality case 
Suppose no crack is detected from inspection at single or multiple members. There are two 
possible explanations for the inspection result. First, a crack is too small to be detected. Second, 
although a relatively large crack actually exists at the inspected location, it may be missed due to 
human error or the limitations of the detecting device. In either case, this event can be described 
as an “inequality” event, i.e. 
   ,: 0dj j no I jIE g T T  X X   (5.4)
where X denotes the vector of random variables including detectable crack size, Tjd denotes the 
required time for the crack growth to a detectable crack size at the j-th member, and TI denotes 
the time that the member is inspected. The detectable crack size is related to a specific inspection 
method and modeled as a random variable reflecting the actual probability of detection (POD) 
curve. Among several stochastic formulations of POD available, numerical examples in this 
study use the exponential distribution, which is commonly used in the literature (Moan and Song 
2000). 
The conditional probability given the event in Eq. (5.4), i.e. single inequality event, may 
be calculated as  
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Likewise, the conditional probability given multiple inequality events is calculated as 
    
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  (5.6)
5.2.2. Equality case 
If a crack is detected and measured, this inspection event is described as an “equality” event and 
formulated as 
   ,: 0mj j yes I jIE g T T  X X  (5.7)
where Tjm denotes the required time for the crack growth to the measured crack size at the j-th 
member. In the equation, it should be noted that Tjm is equal to the inspection time TI, which 
makes the formulation different from the limit-state formulations in Eq. (5.4). 
The conditional probability given the equality event in Eq. (5.7) is calculated as 
    
  
 
,
,
,
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|
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i j yesi j
i up i j
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X
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
 (5.8)
The updated probability Pi,up in Eq. (5.8) cannot be easily calculated using existing structural 
reliability methods because both numerator and denominator are close to zero. In order to 
117 
 
facilitate the calculation, the following alternative formulation is used. First, Eq. (5.8) can be 
alternatively described as 
  
  
,
, 0
,
0
lim
0
i j yes
i up
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P E g
P
P g
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X
X

 (5.9)
In the equation, infinitesimal is θ introduced to eliminate the equal signs in Eq. (5.8). Eq. (5.9) is 
equal to 
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Finally, Eq. (5.10) can be transformed to the ratio of the sensitivities with respect to the 
parameter θ, i.e. 
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 (5.11)
This formulation is the same as shown in Moan and Song (2000), and the updated probability 
can be calculated via numerical differentiation of the results of reliability analysis performed by 
use of an existing reliability analysis method. 
Likewise, the conditional probability given multiple equality events is formulated as 
follows. 
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The equation is transformed to the ratio of sensitivities with respect to the parameters θ1, …, θn, 
that is,  
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where n is the number of the observed “equality” events. The updated probability Pi,up in Eq. 
(5.13) can also be calculated using the n-th order numerical differentiation. However, this 
equation needs to be used with a caution, because such a high-order numerical differentiation can 
create significant error unless the probability calculations in numerator and denominator are 
extremely accurate. This may give rise to the research needs for new methods to evaluate 
component and system reliability estimate more precisely than the existing methods. However, 
this is out of the scope of this thesis, and multiple equality events will not be handled in the 
numerical examples. 
5.2.3. Mixed case 
In most practical situations, inspections are made at multiple locations at a given time, which 
often results in a mixed set of inequality and equality events. To derive the formulation for such 
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“mixed cases,” the simplest case involved with single inequality event and single equality event 
is first considered. From Eq. (5.3), the updated failure probability is formulated as 
, |i up i j kP P E IE IE      (5.14)
where IEj and IEk denote the inequality event and equality event, respectively. Using Eqs. (5.5) 
and (5.8), Eq. (5.14) is further derived as follows. 
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Based on the same derivation as Eqs. (5.8) - (5.11), Eq. (5.15) can be transformed to 
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Finally, this formulation can be generalized for a mixed case involved with multiple inequality 
and equality inspection events as 
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 (5.17)
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where n is the number of equality events. Furthermore, it can be easily seen that Eq. (5.17) is the 
combination of Eqs. (5.6) and (5.13). For the aforementioned difficulty in high order numerical 
differentiation, the mixed case with multiple equality events will not be discussed in this thesis. 
5.3. System Reliability Updating Method Employing B3 Method 
To update the probability of a system failure caused by fatigue-induced sequential failures based 
on inspection results, a system reliability updating method is developed using the B3 method. As 
explained in Chapters 3 and 4, the B3 method identifies system failure and non-failure cases (i.e. 
black and white nodes in the event tree, see Figure 3.1) as disjoint events and obtains the upper 
and lower bounds of system failure probability. From Eq. (3.17), the conditional probability of 
the system failure is derived as the sum of conditional probabilities of the failure sequences 
given inspection events, i.e. 
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1 1
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 
 
 
(5.18)
where IE denotes an equality or inequality event observed during the inspection or the 
intersection of multiple observed events. Therefore, one can obtain bounds on the updated 
system failure probability by replacing the probabilities of the failure and non-failure cases 
identified by the B3 analysis by the updated ones.  
 Therefore, the system reliability updating is a two-step procedure. First, B3 analysis is 
performed to identify system failure and non-failure cases as well as to calculate upper and lower 
bounds on system failure probability. Second, the probabilities of the identified system failure 
cases (black nodes in the event tree) and non-failure cases (white nodes) are updated using Eqs. 
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(5.6), (5.13), and (5.17), and the updated upper and lower bounds on the updated system 
reliability are obtained. For example, Figure 5.1 shows the event tree in Figure 3.1 after updated 
by a given inspection event IEi. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Probability updates for failure and non-failure cases 
 
The mixed nodes (i.e. grey nodes) do not need to be updated because those are not used 
to compute the bounds, which helps achieve the updated bounds efficiently. Another advantage 
of this method is that the second step does not require additional structural analyses (or FE 
simulations). However, it is also important to note that the system failure sequences identified as 
critical ones for the original system failure probability may not be critical for the updated 
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(conditional) failure probability. Therefore, the bounds may get wider during the updating 
process. 
For inequality cases, using Eqs. (3.4) and (4.1), the required time for the crack growth to 
a detectable crack size at the j-th member (Tjd) in Eq. (5.4) can be derived as 
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where ad is the detectable crack size during the inspection process. 
For truss and continuum structures, therefore, the limit-state function for an inequality 
event in Eq. (5.4) is described as 
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Likewise, for equality cases, the limit-state function in Eq. (5.7) is described as 
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where am is the measured crack size and εm is the measuring error. Lastly, for mixed case, Eq. 
(5.17) can be used with the Eqs. (5.20) and (5.21). The proposed method of system reliability 
updating for fatigue-induced sequential failures is tested and verified by the multi-layer Daniels 
system and aircraft longeron structure, both of which were already introduced in Chapters 3 and 
4. 
5.4. Numerical Example I: Multi-layer Daniels System 
5.4.1. Problem description 
In order to test the proposed method, a multi-layer Daniels system is considered as the first 
numerical example. Most of the details are exactly same as for the one in Section 4.3. Table 5.1 
lists the hypothetical inspection scenarios investigated in the numerical example. 
 
Case Scenario number Scenario description 
Inequality 
1 No crack is detected at member 1  (TI = 2,000 hours & mean of ad = 1.0 mm). 
2 No crack is detected at member 1  (TI = 2,000 hours & mean of ad = 0.5 mm). 
3 No crack is detected at member 1  (TI = 4,000 hours & mean of ad = 1.0 mm). 
4 No crack is detected anywhere  (TI = 2,000 hours & mean of ad = 1.0 mm). 
Equality 
5 0.1mm crack is found at member 1 (TI = 2,000 hours). 
6 0.3mm crack is found at member 1 (TI = 2,000 hours). 
7 0.5mm crack is found at member 1 (TI = 2,000 hours). 
8 0.5mm crack is found at member 1 (TI = 4,000 hours). 
Mixed 9 0.5mm crack is found at member 1, but nowhere else  (TI = 2,000 hours & mean of ad = 1.0 mm). 
 
Table 5.1 Inspection scenarios for generalized Daniels system 
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5.4.2. Statistical properties 
As in Section 4.3, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that all the random variables are 
statistically independent. Their statistical properties including detectable crack size (ad) and 
measuring error (εm) are shown in Table 5.2. The statistical information of the new random 
variables is determined based on a literature review (Moan and Song 2000). 
 
Random variables Mean c.o.v. Distribution type 
Number of 
random variables 
C 1.202×10−13 0.533 Lognormal 6 
m 3.0 0.02 Lognormal 6 
a0 (mm) 0.11 1.0 Exponential 6 
ad (mm) 
(inequality cases) 
1.0 
(0.5 for Scenario 2) 1.0 Exponential
Number of 
inspected 
members 
εm (mm) 
crack sizing error 
(equality cases) 
0 
0.1 
(standard 
deviation)
Normal Number of inspections 
I 1.0 0.1 Lognormal 1 
 
Table 5.2 Statistical properties of random variables 
 
It should be noted that the detectable crack size (ad) and the crack sizing error (εm) in 
Table 5.2 are used only for inequality and equality cases, respectively, which means each 
instance of crack detection or non-detection brings an additional random variable. In mixed cases, 
both of the random variables are introduced, and the number of them is the same as the number 
of inspections regardless of crack-detection. 
5.4.3. Analysis results 
For a verification purpose, the updated reliability by the proposed method is compared to that by 
Monte Carlo simulation (MCS). For inequality case, it is straightforward to compute the updated 
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reliability using existing simulation techniques. However, if one or more observations are of the 
equality type, both numerator and denominator in Eq. (5.7) are very close to zero and the 
updated reliability cannot be evaluated directly using MCS. In order to overcome this challenge, 
a new method using a likelihood function has been developed (Straub 2011). In the method, 
equality information is transformed into inequality information, which enables reliability 
updating by use of a general MCS technique. 
As explained in Section 5.2.2, for equality events, the reliability updating based on the 
proposed method has to be done carefully because it requires numerical differentiation using 
infinitesimal θ and the corresponding result is often sensitive to θ. In the numerical examples of 
this thesis, it was decided through numerical tests to use one percent of the limit-state function 
(i.e. gj,yes(X) in Eq. (5.17)) evaluated with the mean values of random variables as θ. Figure 5.2 
shows the probabilities at multiple time points from the B3 method and MCS. As shown in the 
figure, the failure probability increases with the increasing service time of the structure, and the 
results from the B3 method and MCS match well. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Original system failure probabilities by B3 method and MCS 
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Figure 5.3 Updating results by the proposed method and MCS for inequality cases (Scenarios 
1-4 in Table 5.1) 
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Figure 5.4 Updating results by the proposed method and MCS for equality cases (Scenarios 5-
8 in Table 5.1) 
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Figure 5.5 Updating results by the proposed method and MCS for mixed case (Scenario 9 in 
Table 5.1) 
 
Figures 5.3-5 compare the results by the proposed method to those by MCS. As shown in 
the figures, the updated failure probabilities estimated by the proposed method and MCS show 
good agreement. 
Next, the updated probabilities of different scenarios are compared with each other to 
investigate the impact of various inspection conditions on the reliability updating, such as the 
number of inspections, crack detecting resolution, an inspection interval, and measured crack 
length. As observed in Chapters 3 and 4, the actual system failure probability is fairly close to 
the upper bound from B3 analysis. Therefore, only the upper bounds are provided in the plots to 
facilitate clear comparison. 
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Figure 5.6 Comparison of updated probabilities for inequality cases (Scenarios 1-4 in Table 
5.1) 
 
Figure 5.6 compares the original system failure probability and the probabilities updated 
by inequality cases (Scenarios 1-4). In Scenario 1, the reliability updating decreases the failure 
probability because no crack has been detected even after 2,000 hours. The updated failure 
probability decreases further in Scenario 2 because no crack is detected even when a better 
crack-detecting device is used (with a smaller mean of detectable crack size ad). In Scenario 3, 
no crack is detected even though an inspection is made at a later time (4,000 hours) than in 
130 
 
Scenario 1, which further reduces the system failure probability. In Scenario 4, it is assumed that 
crack is not observed at any of the members. Since the structure consists of six members, the 
inspection event described as the intersection of six inequality events, as shown in Eq. (5.6). 
Compared to Scenario 1, we have five additional signs indicating the better safety of the 
structure, which further reduces the system failure probability as shown in Figure 5.6. 
To further investigate the performance of the proposed method, the update of the 
probability of each system failure sequence in Scenario 1 is shown in Table 5.3. The original 
probabilities are the same as those in Table 4.1. 
 
Failure 
sequence 
Original probability 
(×10−3) 
Updated probability (×10−3) 
Proposed method MCS 
1 4.871 0.196 0.188 
2 → 3 1.332 1.299 1.281 
3 → 2 1.332 1.299 1.320 
4 → 5 → 6 0.294 0.285 0.305 
4 → 6 → 5 0.294 0.285 0.311 
5 → 4 → 6 0.294 0.285 0.263 
5 → 6 → 4 0.294 0.285 0.283 
6 → 4 → 5 0.294 0.285 0.279 
6 → 5 → 4 0.294 0.285 0.293 
 
Table 5.3 Updated probabilities of critical system failure sequences in Scenario 1 (in Table 
5.1) 
 
Since the inspection was made at member 1 only and no crack was found, the probability 
of the failure sequence including member 1 decrease significantly while the others experience 
small updates. It is noted that the reliability of uninspected members also can be updated, 
because they are correlated with the inspected ones (i.e. member 1 in this case) by sharing 
common random variables in their limit-state functions. 
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Figure 5.7 Comparison of updated probabilities for equality cases (Scenarios 5-8 in Table 5.1) 
 
For equality cases, Figure 5.7 shows the updated failure probabilities of Scenarios 5-8. 
From Scenario 5 to Scenario 7, the measured crack size increases from 0.1mm to 0.5mm. It is 
clearly seen that the longer crack size is measured, the more likely the system is to fail. In 
Scenarios 8, the same size of crack as Scenario 7 is measured later time, which reduces the 
updated system failure probability. 
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Failure 
sequence 
Original probability 
(×10−3) 
Updated probability (×10−3) 
Proposed method MCS 
1 4.871 0.062 0.000 
2 → 3 1.332 1.220 1.285 
3 → 2 1.332 1.220 1.266 
4 → 5 → 6 0.294 0.265 0.288 
4 → 6 → 5 0.294 0.265 0.280 
5 → 4 → 6 0.294 0.265 0.244 
5 → 6 → 4 0.294 0.265 0.231 
6 → 4 → 5 0.294 0.265 0.248 
6 → 5 → 4 0.294 0.265 0.243 
 
Table 5.4 Updated probabilities of critical system failure sequences in Scenario 5 (in Table 
5.1) 
 
Table 5.4 shows the updated probabilities of the critical failure sequences in Scenario 5. 
As observed in the inequality scenarios, the probabilities of the failure sequences involving 
member 1 significantly decrease in Scenario 5, and the other probabilities also decrease slightly. 
This is because the observed crack length (0.1mm) is small considering the inspection time 
(2,000 hours), and the failures of the inspected and uninspected members are correlated through 
common random variables in the limit-state functions. It is also noteworthy that the proposed 
reliability updating method show relative errors around 5-10%. This is because of the numerical 
differentiation that is introduced to calculate the derivative terms in Eq. (5.11).  
As previously stated, traditional reliability updating methods employing numerical 
differentiation can cause errors, even in a simple reliability problem whose limit-state function is 
expressed analytically with a few random and deterministic variables (Straub 2011). In this thesis, 
the First-Order Reliability Method (FORM) and Second-order Reliability Method (SORM) are 
employed for component reliability analysis. Both of them are widely-used reliability analysis 
methods that can describe the statistical dependence between component events effectively. 
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However, they are based on the first- and second-order approximations of a limit-state surface. 
This concept may cause some errors in component reliability analysis, and the error may be 
propagated to the system reliability analysis. The errors are due to the complexity of the 
reliability problem, which is characterized as follows: (1) system failure is defined by a large 
number of failure sequences; (2) many random variables are non-normal; and (3) limit-state 
functions are nonlinear. As shown in the results of the updated probabilities, the error is not 
critical for inequality cases. On the contrary, the error may increase to a noticeable level in the 
equality cases, whose updated probabilities can be sensitive numerically. It is necessary to 
develop new component and system reliability analysis methods that can overcome this 
challenge and provide more precise component and system reliability estimates than the existing 
methods. However, it is out of the scope of this research. 
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Figure 5.8 Comparison of updated probabilities for mixed case (Scenario 9 in Table 5.1) 
 
Lastly, Figure 5.8 compares the updated probabilities for Scenarios 7 and 9. It is seen that 
the updated failure probability becomes much smaller in Scenario 9 than in Scenario 7 even 
though the same size of crack was observed at the same inspection time point. This is due to the 
additional inequality events, “no more cracks are detected at other locations (i.e. members 2-6)” 
observed in the mixed case for Scenario 9.  
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5.5. Numerical Example II: Longeron in Aircraft Structure 
5.5.1. Problem description 
As another numerical example to test the proposed system reliability updating method, the 
aircraft longeron system in Chapter 4 is considered. Most of the details are the same as those in 
Section 4.4. Table 5.5 lists the inspection scenarios considered for reliability updating. 
 
Case Scenario number Scenario description 
Inequality 
1 No crack is detected at member 5  (TI = 2,000 hours & mean of ad = 1.0 mm). 
2 No crack is detected at member 5  (TI = 2,000 hours & mean of ad = 0.5 mm). 
3 No crack is detected at member 5 (TI = 4,000 hours & mean of ad = 1.0 mm). 
4 No crack is detected anywhere (TI = 2,000 hours & mean of ad = 1.0 mm). 
Equality 
5 0.1mm crack is found at member 5 (TI = 2,000 hours). 
6 0.3mm crack is found at member 5 (TI = 2,000 hours). 
7 0.5mm crack is found at member 5 (TI = 2,000 hours). 
8 0.5mm crack is found at member 5 (TI = 4,000 hours). 
Mixed 9 0.5mm crack is found at member 5, but nowhere else  (TI = 2,000 hours & mean of ad = 1.0 mm). 
 
Table 5.5 Inspection scenarios for longeron system 
 
5.5.2. Statistical properties 
The statistical properties of the random variables given in Table 5.2 are used for this example. 
Unlike the Daniels system example, non-zero correlation coefficients are assigned for the 
following cases to make the example realistic: (1) between Paris equation parameters (C) of two 
different parts (correlation coefficient: 0.6); (2) between Paris equation parameters (m) of two 
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different parts (correlation: 0.6); (3) between initial crack lengths (a0) of two different fastener 
holes (correlation: 0.6); (4) between C and m of the same parts (correlation: −0.97); (5) between 
C and m of two different parts (correlation: −0.6); and (6) between the same kind of inspections 
(correlation: 0.6). In the other cases, it is assumed that the random variables are independent. 
The correlation coefficients in cases (1) through (5) are the same as for Section 4.4, and 
(6) represents the correlation between inspections at multiple locations with the same device. The 
correlation coefficients in cases (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6) can change depending on how closely 
the manufacturing and inspection processes of two different parts are related to each other. 
Lastly, the strong negative correlation between C and m in case (4) is based on a literature review 
(Yarema 1980, Borrego et al. 2001), as discussed in Section 4.4.2. 
5.5.3. Analysis results 
Let us compare the updated probabilities from the scenarios given in Table 5.5. The overall trend 
in the updated probabilities is similar to that of the Daniels system example in Section 5.4. First, 
as shown in Figure 5.9, the updated probability in Scenario 1 is smaller than the original 
probability because no crack is detected. In addition, the updated probability decreases further in 
Scenarios 2 and 3, in which a better crack-detection device and a later inspection are respectively 
assumed. In Scenario 4, it is assumed that no cracks are detected at any locations. Since the 
longeron structure has a total of 40 possible cracking locations, the inspection event includes 40 
inequality cases. Obviously, the inspection result indicates that the structure is much more 
reliable than Scenario 1, as shown in the figure. 
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Figure 5.9 Comparison of updated probabilities for inequality cases (Scenarios 1-4 in Table 
5.5) 
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Figure 5.10 Comparison of updated probabilities for equality cases (Scenarios 5-8 in Table 5.5) 
 
For equality cases, Figure 5.10 shows the updated failure probabilities for Scenarios 5-8. 
The updated probabilities in Scenarios 5-7 show how they increase with the increasing measured 
size of a crack. When comparing the results from Scenarios 7 and 8, it is observed that the 
updated probability for Scenario 8 is much smaller, which is because the same size crack is 
detected from an inspection at a later time. 
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Figure 5.11 Comparison of updated probabilities for mixed case (Scenario 9 in Table 5.5) 
 
Lastly, Figure 5.11 shows the updated probabilities for Scenarios 7 and 9. It turns out that 
the updated failure probability is much smaller compared for Scenario 9. The reason is, although 
a large crack is detected at member 1, no more cracks are detected at other locations (i.e. 
members 1-40 except for 5). 
In these reliability update analyses, it is noteworthy that it took only a few minutes to 
perform the reliability updating in each scenario (using a general personal computer with 2.61 
GHz CPU and 3.25 GB RAM), which is one of the powerful benefits from the proposed method 
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in efficiency. This is possible because, as previously stated, the reliability updating step is based 
on the results of the prior B3 analysis and requires updating the probabilities of system failure 
and non-failure cases only without new FE simulations or B3 analysis. This allows for significant 
saving in computational time because each FE analysis in this example takes several minutes. 
5.6. Summary 
This chapter introduces a new reliability updating method for fatigue-induced sequential failures, 
by integrating the B3 method with existing formulations of reliability updating. For effective 
risk-based maintenance, it is essential to estimate the reliability of a structure against fatigue-
induced sequential failures and update the original reliability based on the observations from 
inspections. The proposed reliability updating is a two-step procedure: 1) B3 analysis is 
performed to identify system failure and non-failure cases as well as calculate upper and lower 
bounds on system failure probability; and 2) the probabilities of the identified system failure and 
non-failure cases are updated to obtain the updated upper and lower bounds. Since the B3 
analysis identifies most critical failure and non-failure cases, the updated probabilities 
conditioned on inspection events also provide accurately-updated upper and lower bounds on 
system failure probability with a reasonable gap. In addition, the new method allows us to update 
the original probability efficiently because it reuses the results of the B3 analysis. The proposed 
method was demonstrated by two numerical examples, multi-layer Daniels system and aircraft 
longeron structure. In the first example, the results from the proposed method were compared 
with the ones from Monte Carlo simulation, which showed that the proposed method enabled us 
to obtain accurately-updated reliability estimates of truss and continuum subject to the risk of 
fatigue-induced sequential failures. In addition, the impact of various inspection conditions on 
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the reliability updating was investigated in both of the numerical examples, such as the number 
of inspections, crack detecting resolution, inspection interval, and measured crack length. The 
investigation confirmed that the method allows for reliability updating under various inspection 
scenarios. Lastly, especially in the aircraft longeron example, it is noteworthy that it took only a 
few minutes to obtain the updated reliability bounds in each scenario because the reliability 
updating method does not require new system reliability analysis or FE simulations. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. Summary of Major Findings 
This thesis developed novel methods for finite-element-based system reliability analysis and 
updating of structures subject to fatigue-induced sequential failures. As the first step, a 
framework for finite element system reliability analysis (FE-SRA) was proposed by integrating 
FE simulation with the matrix-based system reliability (MSR) method. In addition, a new 
Branch-and-Bound method employing system reliability Bounds (termed the B3 method) was 
developed to perform system reliability analysis of fatigue-induced sequential failures of truss 
structures while accounting for load re-distribution. The method was further developed for 
applications to continuum structures. Lastly, a new inspection-based system reliability updating 
method was developed based on the use of the B3 method. The proposed methods were applied 
to several numerical examples of discrete and continuum structures and successfully 
demonstrated. This study provided the following major findings: 
 As a computational platform of the proposed FE-SRA framework, an interface code, 
FERUM-ABAQUS, was developed. In the framework, the reliability analysis package 
FERUM repeatedly calls ABAQUS® to obtain structural responses during a component 
reliability analysis, and a system reliability analysis using the matrix-based system 
reliability (MSR) method is performed by use of the results of the individual reliability 
analyses in the component level. The proposed framework allows us to compute the 
probabilities of general system events and their sensitivities with respect to design 
parameters based on the results of the component-level FE reliability analyses. Also, 
FERUM-ABAQUS is a more versatile computing platform than other existing FE-RA 
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software because it employs FERUM and ABAQUS®, both of which are respectively 
specialized in reliability and FE analyses. Finally, the proposed framework and FERUM-
ABAQUS were successfully demonstrated through numerical examples of an aircraft 
wing torque box and a bridge pylon. 
 The B3 method can estimate the probability of system failure caused by fatigue-induced 
sequential failures by identifying critical system failure sequences efficiently and 
accurately. Due to the proposed disjoint cut-set formulation employing a recursive 
formulation of limit-states and systematic search procedure, the B3 method can identify 
critical sequences of fatigue-induced failures causing a system failure in the decreasing 
order of their likelihood. Since the conventional branch-and-bound approaches 
employing non-disjoint cut-set provide only upper bound, there is a risk of 
underestimating the actual system failure probability. However, the proposed method 
provides both lower and upper bounds on the system failure probability while the size of 
the updates on each bound is diminishing monotonically. Every structural analysis or 
finite element simulation performed during the search contributes to narrowing the 
bounds. This significantly reduces the computational time required for accurate results 
especially when computational cost for structural analyses is dominant. The updated 
bounds provide reasonable criteria for terminating a branch-and-bound search without 
missing critical sequences. After a demonstration by a multi-layer Daniels system, the 
method was tested by a three-dimensional offshore structure with 66 members. The 
results by the B3 method were verified by crude Monte Carlo simulations. The merits of 
the proposed approach were successfully demonstrated through comparison with the 
results by a conventional branch-and-bound approach. 
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 The B3 method was further developed for FE-based system reliability analysis of fatigue-
induced sequential failures of continuum structures. Despite merits over existing branch-
and-bound approaches, the B3 method which was originally developed for truss is not 
readily applicable to continuum structures because of its limitations in (1) describing 
general stress distributions in limit-state formulations; (2) evaluating stress intensity 
range based on the crack length; and (3) dealing with slow convergence of the bounds for 
continuum. In order to overcome these limitations, (1) the limit-state function was 
modified to incorporate general stress distribution instead of using far-field stress 
assumption; (2) an external computer program such as AFGROW® was incorporated 
into the B3 computational framework to estimate the stress intensity range for the given 
stress distribution; and (3) the termination criteria of B3 analysis was modified to avoid 
performing unnecessary simulations that would make insignificant updates on the lower 
bound. The B3 method for continuum was demonstrated by a numerical example of 
multi-layer Daniels system, and the results were verified by the B3 method for truss and 
Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, the proposed method was applied to a numerical 
example of aircraft longeron system. In the example, first of all, it was proved that the 
termination criteria newly introduced for the B3 method for continuum enabled us to 
reduce computational and time costs significantly, by avoiding identifying many 
negligible failure sequences. In addition, it was shown that the proposed method enable 
us to calculate the system-level risk of fatigue-induced sequential failures using a large-
scale FE models, efficiently and accurately. Lastly, the method can identify the most 
critical failure sequences in the decreasing order of their probabilities.  
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 The new method for system reliability updating enables us to update the original 
structural reliability based on inspection results in an accurate and efficient way. The 
reliability updating procedure is two folds: 1) B3 analysis is performed to identify system 
failure and non-failure cases as well as calculate upper and lower bounds on system 
failure probability; and 2) the probabilities of the identified system failure and non-failure 
cases are updated to obtain the updated upper and lower bounds. Since the B3 analysis 
identifies most critical failure and non-failure cases, their updated probabilities 
conditioned on inspection events also provide accurately-updated upper and lower 
bounds on system failure probability with a reasonable gap. In addition, the new method 
allows us to update the original probability efficiently because it reuses the results of the 
B3 analysis. The proposed method was first applied to a numerical example of multi-layer 
Daniels system, and the results were verified by Monte Carlo simulation (MCS). The 
verification using MCS was not an easy task if any observations were of the equality type. 
In order to overcome this challenge, a new method (Straub 2011) using a likelihood 
function has been employed. In this example, first of all, it was successfully shown that 
the proposed method updated the original probabilities accurately for various inspection 
scenarios. In addition, it was observed that the probabilities of the failure sequences 
involved with the structural member where no crack or a small crack was detected 
decreased significantly. On the other hand, the probabilities of the failure sequences 
involved with the structural member having a large crack increased. However, it could 
not provide perfectly accurate results, with relative errors around 5-10%, when the 
inspection results included equality information. The proposed method was also applied 
to an example of aircraft longeron, and it was successfully shown that the method could 
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perform system reliability updating of fatigue-induced sequential failures for various 
inspection scenarios, efficiently and accurately. 
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6.2. Future Research Topics 
The proposed methods can be further developed to further improve accuracy and efficiency of 
reliability analysis and updating as well as applicability to complex structural systems in practice. 
The following future research topics are suggested: 
 Apply the proposed FE-SRA framework and computational platform FERUM-ABAQUS 
to structural reliability problems in consideration of the nonlinear behavior of structures. 
In reality, the reliability of structural systems should be estimated by considering their 
nonlinear properties in both material and geometry. However, the current framework and 
computational platform were tested by linear elastic problems only. The developed 
framework and platform have potentials of dealing with system-level risk assessment of 
nonlinear problems. 
 Perform system reliability analysis of sequential failures induced by extreme loading. 
Yielding failure caused by extreme environmental loading is another important failure 
mode of structures, and sequential failures resulting in an entire system collapse may 
occur due to both fatigue and yielding. However, the current B3 method is able to deal 
with fatigue-induced sequential failures only. Therefore, the method needs to be further 
developed such that it can perform system reliability analysis of sequential failures 
caused by yielding. 
 Perform a parametric study about the approximation introduced to the B3 method for 
continuum. Although it was shown in Section 4.3 that the approximation introduced in 
the B3 method for continuum did not have a significant impact on the reliability analysis 
results in the numerical example, it is still necessary to investigate more cases in various 
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conditions: for example, different geometric functions from the one in Eq. (4.12) can be 
employed. 
 Further develop the B3 method so that it can re-define possible cracking 
locations/members. Currently, the B3 method requires defining possible cracking 
locations before the analysis. In many nonlinear structural systems, however, it is hard to 
pre-define the cracking locations because the locations may vary with the prior local 
failures during a sequential failure. If the B3 method can automatically re-define possible 
failure locations in each damage status (e.g., from the stress distribution), it will allow us 
to solve nonlinear structural systems more accurately. 
 In reality, if inspection results indicate that the target structure is damaged to have 
insufficient level of safety, the damaged structural members may be repaired or replaced. 
For reliability-based inspection planning and structural maintenance, the reliability of the 
structure should be updated again after such maintenance efforts. However, the current B3 
method cannot update the structural reliability based on such changes. There have been 
some studies about such post-repairing reliability updating methods which are applicable 
to simple structures (Moan and Song 2000). Inspired by the existing research, the B3 
method can be expanded to estimate how the reliability of a damaged structure is updated 
by repairing. Based on the research, optimized inspection planning or risk based 
inspection (RBI) can also be suggested. 
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